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Preface | |
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Introduction: A Few Preliminaries | |
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Mind | |
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Introduction | |
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Descartes: The beginnings of modern philosophy of mind | |
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The private-language argument | |
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Computers as models of the mind | |
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Why should there be a functionalist theory? | |
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Functionalism: A first problem | |
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A simple-minded functionalist theory of pain | |
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Ramsey's solution to the first problem | |
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Functionalism: A second problem | |
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M again | |
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Consciousness | |
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The puzzle of the physical | |
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Conclusion | |
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Knowledge | |
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Introduction | |
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Plato: Knowledge as justified true belief | |
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Descartes' way: Justification requires certainty | |
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Locke's way: Justification can be less than certain | |
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The foundations of knowledge | |
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Ways around skepticism I: Verificationism | |
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Ways around skepticism II: Causal theories of knowledge | |
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Causal theories contrasted with traditional accounts of justification | |
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Epistemology naturalized | |
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Conclusion | |
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Language | |
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Introduction | |
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The linguistic turn | |
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The beetle in the box | |
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Frege's "sense" and "reference" | |
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Predicates and open sentences | |
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Problems of intensionality | |
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Truth conditions and possible worlds | |
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Analytic-synthetic and necessary-contingent | |
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Natural language and logical form | |
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Using logic: Truth preservation, probability, and the lottery paradox | |
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Logical truth and logical properties | |
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Conventions of language | |
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The paradox of analysis | |
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Conclusion | |
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Science | |
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Introduction | |
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Description and prescription | |
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An example: Gregor Mendel's genetic theory | |
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Theory and observation | |
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The received view of theories | |
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The deductive-nomological model of explanation | |
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Theory reduction and instrumentalism | |
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Theory-ladenness | |
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Justifying theories I: The problem of induction | |
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Goodman's new riddle of induction | |
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Justifying theories II: Popper and falsification | |
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Justifying theories III: Inference to the best explanation | |
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Laws and causation | |
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Conclusion | |
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Morality | |
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Introduction | |
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Facts and values | |
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Realism and emotivism | |
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Intuitionism | |
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Emotivism again | |
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Kant's universalizability principle | |
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Dealing with relativism | |
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Prescriptivism and supervenience | |
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Problems of utilitarianism I: Defining "utility" | |
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Problems of utilitarianism II: Consequentialism versus absolutism | |
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Rights | |
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Self and others | |
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Conclusion | |
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Politics | |
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Introduction | |
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Hobbes: Escaping the state of nature | |
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Problems for Hobbes | |
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Game theory I: Two-person zero-sum games | |
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Game theory II: The prisoners' dilemma | |
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The limits of prudence | |
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Rawls's theory of justice | |
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The difference principle and inequality surpluses | |
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Criticizing Rawls I: The structure of his argument | |
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Criticizing Rawls II: Why maximin? | |
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Criticizing Rawls III: The status of the two principles | |
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Reflective equilibrium | |
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Are the two principles right? | |
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Nozick: Beginning with rights | |
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The entitlement theory | |
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Ethics and politics | |
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Conclusion | |
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Law | |
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Introduction | |
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Defining "law" I: Positivism and natural law | |
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Defining "law" II: Legal systems and the variety of laws | |
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Hart: The elements of a legal system | |
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Punishment: The problem | |
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Justifying punishment: Deterrence | |
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Retributivism: Kant's objections | |
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Combining deterrence and retribution | |
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Deterrence theory again | |
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Why do definitions matter? | |
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Conclusion | |
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Metaphysics | |
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Introduction | |
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An example: The existence of numbers | |
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"God" as a proper name | |
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The necessary being | |
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Hume: No a priori proofs of matters of fact | |
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Kant: "Existence" is not a predicate | |
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A posteriori arguments | |
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The argument from design | |
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The harmony of nature | |
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The necessity of a creative intelligence | |
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Hume's argument from design: The argument from experience | |
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The problem of evil and inference to the best explanation | |
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Conclusion | |
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Philosophy | |
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Introduction | |
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Traditional thought | |
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Arguing with the Azande | |
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The significance of literacy | |
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Cognitive relativism | |
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The argument against strong relativism | |
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The argument for weak relativism | |
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Philosophy and religion | |
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Philosophy and science | |
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An example: Free will and determinism | |
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Compatibilism and moral responsibility | |
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The special character of philosophy | |
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Conclusion | |
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Notes | |
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Index | |