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| Preface | |
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| Each chapter ends with notes | |
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| Introduction | |
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| What is Game Theory? | |
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| An Outline of the History of Game Theory | |
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| John von Neumann | |
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| The Theory of Rational Choice | |
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| Coming Attractions: Interacting Decision-Makers | |
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| I. Games with Perfect Information | |
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| Nash Equilibrium: Theory | |
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| Strategic Games | |
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| Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma | |
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| Example: Bach or Stravinsky? | |
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| Example: Matching Pennies | |
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| Example: The Stag Hunt | |
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| Nash Equilibrium | |
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| John F. Nash, Jr | |
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| Studying Nash Equilibrium Experimentally | |
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| Examples of Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Experimental Evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma | |
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| Focal Points | |
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| Best Response Functions | |
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| Dominated Actions | |
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| Equilibrium in a Single Population: Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria | |
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| Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations | |
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| Cournot's Model of Oligopoly | |
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| Bertrand's Model of Oligopoly | |
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| Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: Some Historical Notes | |
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| Electoral Competition | |
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| The War of Attrition | |
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| Auctions | |
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| Auctions from Babylonia to eBay | |
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| Accident Law | |
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| Mixed Strategy Equilibrium | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Some Evidence on Expected Payoff Functions | |
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| Strategic Games in Which Players May Randomize | |
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| Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Dominated Actions | |
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| Pure Equilibria When Randomization is Allowed | |
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| Illustration: Expert Diagnosis | |
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| Equilibrium in a Single Population | |
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| Illustration: Reporting a Crime | |
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| Reporting a Crime: Social Psychology and Game Theory | |
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| The Formation of Players' Beliefs | |
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| Extension: Finding All Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria | |
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| Extension: Games in Which Each Player Has a Continuum of Actions | |
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| Appendix: Representing Preferences by Expected Payoffs | |
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| Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory | |
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| Extensive Games with Perfect Information | |
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| Strategies and Outcomes | |
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| Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | |
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| Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite Horizon Games: Backward Induction | |
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| Ticktacktoe, Chess, and Related Games | |
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| Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations | |
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| The Ultimatum Game, the Holdup Game, and Agenda Control | |
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| Experiments on the Ultimatum Game | |
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| Stackelberg's Model of Duopoly | |
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| Buying Votes | |
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| A Race | |
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| Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion | |
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| Allowing for Simultaneous Moves | |
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| More Experimental Evidence on Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | |
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| Illustration: Entry into a Monopolized Industry | |
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| Illustration: Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters | |
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| Illustration: Committee Decision-Making | |
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| Illustration: Exit from a Declining Industry | |
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| Allowing for Exogenous Uncertainty | |
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| Discussion: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward Induction | |
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| Experimental Evidence on the Centipede Game | |
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| Coalitional Games and the Core | |
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| Coalitional Games | |
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| The Core | |
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| Illustration: Ownership and the Distribution of Wealth | |
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| Illustration: Exchanging Homogeneous Horses | |
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| Illustration: Exchanging Heterogeneous Houses | |
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| Illustration | |