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Freedom Within Reason

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ISBN-10: 0195085655

ISBN-13: 9780195085655

Edition: 1990 (Reprint)

Authors: Susan Wolf

List price: $83.00
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In this book, Susan Wolf charts a course between incompatibilism, or the notion that freedom and responsibility require casual and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature, and compatibilism, or the notion that people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. Wolf argues that some of the forces which are beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it, enabling us to see the world for what it is. The freedom we want is not independence from the world, but independence from the forces that prevent us from choosing how to live in the light of a sufficient appreciation of the world.
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Book details

List price: $83.00
Copyright year: 1990
Publisher: Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Publication date: 10/21/1993
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 176
Size: 5.51" wide x 8.15" long x 0.55" tall
Weight: 0.660
Language: English

Dr Brent Davies is Professor of International Leadership Development at the University of Hull . He is also a Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne, Visiting Professor at the Institute of Education (University of London), Special Professor at the University of Nottingham and a Faculty Member of the Centre on Educational Governance at the University of Southern California. He is an Associate Director of the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust. nbsp;Brent spent the first ten years of his career working as a teacher in South London. He then moved into higher education and now works exclusively on leadership and management development programmes for senior and middle managers in…    

The Dilemma of Autonomy (In Which the Problems of Responsibility and Free Will Are Presented)
Setting Up the Problem(s): The Dilemma of Autonomy
Defending the Problem as a Problem: The Metaphysical Stance
The Real Self View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility is Examined and Criticized)
Relating the Problems of Free Will and Responsibility to Determinism
Avoiding Autonomy: Developing the Idea of an Agent's Real Self
Problems with the Real Self View
The Autonomy View (In Which an Autonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Examined and Criticized)
The Apparent (but Only Apparent) Autonomy of Valuing Selves
Autonomy as the Ability to Make Radical Choices
The (Non) Desirability of Autonomy
A Last Voice in Favor of Autonomy: The Skeptic's Perspective
The Reason View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Proposed)
The Reason View Compared with the Autonomy View
The Reason View Compared with the Real Self View
The Reason View as an Intermediary between the Other Views
The Asymmetry of the Reason View
The Reason View Applied
Blameworthiness According to the Reason View
The Unity and Spirit of the Reason View
Ability and Possibility (In Which the Implications of Determinism for Responsibility Are Discussed)
Determinism and the Reason View
Conditional Analyses of Ability
An Alternative Characterization of Ability
The Story
The Moral of the Story
The True and the Good (In Which the Metaethical Assumptions of the Reason View Are Examined)
The Role of "the True and the Good" in the Reason View
The Metaethical Spectrum
Varieties of Antiobjectivism
Conceptual Subjectivism's Implications for the Reason View
Normative Pluralism and Its Conjunction with the Reason View
How Much Freedom (and Reason) Do We Need?
Notes
Selected Readings
Index