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Preface to the College Edition | |
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Preface | |
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Introduction | |
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Toward n New Institutional Economics | |
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Some Antecedents | |
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A Preliminary Statement of the Organizational Failures Framework | |
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Three Illustrations | |
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The Organizational Failures Framework | |
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Bounded Rationality and Uncertainty/Complexity | |
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Opportunism and Small Numbers | |
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Information Impactedness | |
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Atmosphere | |
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Summary Remarks | |
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Peer Groups and Simple Hierarchies | |
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1 | |
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2 | |
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3 | |
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4 | |
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5 | |
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Understanding the Employment Relation | |
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Remarks on the Labor Economics Literature | |
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Technology: Conventional and Idiosyncratic Considerations | |
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Individualistic Bargaining Models | |
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The Efficiency Implications of Internal Labor Market Structures | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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Intermediate Product Markets and Vertical Integration | |
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Prior Literature: A Transactional Interpretation | |
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Static Markets | |
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Sales Contracts for Component Supply | |
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Unified Ownership of Plant and Equipment: Simple Hierarchy Extended | |
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Complex Hierarchy: The Employment Relation Extended | |
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Forward Integration into Wholesaling | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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Vertical Integration, II: Some Qualifications | |
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Interfirm Exchange: Some Qualifications | |
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Possible or Purported Antisocial Consequences | |
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Antitrust Implications | |
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Limits of Vertical Integration and Firm Size | |
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Internalizing the Incremental Transaction: Some Disabilities | |
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Size Considerations | |
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Incentive Limits of the Employment Relation | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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The Multidivisional Structure | |
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The Unitary Form Enterprise | |
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Organizational Innovation: The Multidivisional Structure | |
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Competition in the Capital Market | |
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Optimum Divisionalization | |
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The "M-form hypothesis" and Concluding Remarks | |
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Classification Scheme | |
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Conglomerate Organization | |
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The Affirmative Emphasis | |
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Competition in the Capital Market | |
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Public Policy Issues | |
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Some Evidence | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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Market Structure in Relation to Technical and Organizational Innovation | |
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Technical Innovation and Market Structure: The Conventional Dichotomy | |
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Technical Innovation and Market Structure: Refinements | |
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Organizational Innovation and Market Structure | |
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A Systems Approach | |
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Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem | |
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The Current Approach to Unlawful Monopolization | |
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A Market Failure Interpretation of Dominance | |
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Government Intervention and Market Failure | |
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Remedies for Structural Dominance | |
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Application to the Structure-Conduct Controversy | |
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Dominant Firms and the Organizational Failures Framework | |
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Conclusion | |
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Oligopoly: Interfirm versus Intrafirm Organization | |
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Some Antecedents | |
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Oligopoly Regarded as a Problem of Contracting | |
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The Contracting Approach and Prior Treatments Contrasted | |
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Policy Implications: Dominant Firms versus Oligopolistic Interdependence | |
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Conclusions | |
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Toward a Transactional Paradigm | |
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The Organizational Failures Framework and Hierarchy | |
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Antitrust Implications | |
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Some Directions for Future Research | |
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Bibliography | |
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Index | |