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Criminal Dilemmas Understanding and Preventing Crime

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ISBN-10: 3540240098

ISBN-13: 9783540240099

Edition: 2nd 2005 (Revised)

Authors: Katri K. Sieberg

List price: $54.99
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Description:

Fighting crime breeds emotional responses which often lead to counter-productive government policy. To allow a rational analysis of these important concerns, this book employs the thinking of economics, political science, and game theory to develop new perspectives on crime and its causes. A basic assumption is that the criminal is a rational actor who makes decisions based on his or her personal expected gains and costs. By using this assumption, predictions about behaviour as well as emotional concerns such as prostitution and gun control are given a theoretical perspective. By understanding the strategic variables which cause, for example, gang wars and drug sales, we are better equipped…    
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Book details

List price: $54.99
Edition: 2nd
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
Publication date: 6/8/2005
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 200
Size: 6.10" wide x 9.25" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.100
Language: English

Alternative Sentencing
Pisons
Retibution
Rehabilitation
Deterrence
Protection of the Public
Violent Crime and Sex Predators
Recidivism and Violence
Sex Offenders
Incapacitation
Citicisms
Three Strikes
Alternative Sentencing
Victim Compensation
Victim Model
Benefits
Compensation
Pain and Suffering
Alternative Sentencing - Fitting the Crime
Conclusion
Private Prisons
Pivatization Versus Public Service
Positive Side
Drawbacks
Power and Money: Expanding Impisonment and Profit
Conclusion
Prostitution
Victimless Crime
Why is Prostitution Illegal?
Prostitutes
Disease
Drugs
Crime and Violence
The Economics of Prostitution
Results
Consequences and Costs of Hiding
Pimps and Illegal Prostitution
Anti-Pimping Laws
Pimp Model
Unilateral Legalization
Conclusion
Policy
Limited Control
Regulation
Drugs
Introduction
The Ailment
The Cure
Illegal Versus Legal Drugs
Illegal
Hidden but Available
Legal
Demand Versus Supply
Demand
Supply
Illegal Drugs - Negative Effects
Quality
Youth
Violence
Anti-Competitive Strategies
Legal Behavior
Criminal Behavior
Organization
Anarchy
Contracts
Informal Mechanisms
Employee Relations
The Cure?
Legalization
Undercutting the Black Market
Experimentation
Addiction Control
Inelastic Demand
Control
Resources
Legal - The Zuich Problem
Voting With One's Feet
International Pisoners' Dilemma
Conclusion
Gangs
Gangs as Drug Enterprises
Gangs as Alliances
Structure
Protection in Numbers
Protection of Numbers
Economics
Extortion Model
Job Search and the Market for Crime
Conclusion
Gun Control
Introduction
Gun Control
The Right to Bear Arms
The Criminals Have Guns
Guns for Self-Defense
Firearm Accidents
Information
Black Market
Buyers
Deterrence
Rural Versus Urban Characteristics
Deterrence-the Fear of Armed Victims
Open and Concealed Weapons
Model
Reputation: The Chain Store Paradox
Massacres
Statistics
Accidental Deaths
Gun Control
Summary and Problems
Implications and Suggestions
Training
Waiting Peiods
Safeguards
Penalties
Caveat
Conclusion
Police
Introduction
Serve and Protect
Anti-Shirking Policies
Anti-Brutality Policies
Contract Design
Institutional Checks
Discussion
Bibliography
Index