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Foreword to the second edition | |
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Acknowledgements | |
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Chronology | |
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Who's who | |
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Glossary | |
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Maps | |
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Context | |
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Introduction: The Problem | |
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Ideas and Beliefs | |
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Security | |
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Culture | |
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The Cold War in Perspective | |
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Cold War I | |
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Brinkmanship | |
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Detente | |
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Cold War II and the end of the Cold War | |
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Characteristics of the Cold War | |
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Analysis | |
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Cold War I: 1949-1953 | |
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The Berlin Blockade | |
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China | |
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NSC-68 | |
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The War in Korea | |
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To The Brink and Back: 1953-1969 | |
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The Search for a new Relationship | |
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Khrushchev takes over | |
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The Geneva Summit | |
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The Hungarian Revolution | |
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Asia | |
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The Middle East | |
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Other Third World States | |
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Brinkmanship: Berlin | |
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Brinkmanship: Cuba | |
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The War in Vietnam | |
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Detente: 1969-1979 | |
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Forging a new Relationship | |
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A new President and a new Approach | |
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China Changes Sides: Rapprochement with America | |
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SALT | |
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The German Problem Defused | |
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The Middle East | |
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The Agenda Changes as Ford Takes Over | |
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Africa | |
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The Helsinki Accord | |
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A new President Sows Confusion | |
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Carter and Brezhnev reach agreement on SALT II but on little else | |
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Cold War II: 1979-1985 | |
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Detente Fails to Satisfy American Aspirations | |
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Carter's Mixed Record | |
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Disastrous Decision Making in Moscow: Intervention in Afghanistan | |
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Carter, Brzezinski and Cold War II | |
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A new President and a new Departure | |
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Andropov and Reagan: Missed Opportunities | |
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Failure and Success for America | |
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The Ground is Prepared for Better Relations with Russia | |
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Reagan Improves Relations with China | |
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New Political Thinking and the end of the Cold War: 1985-1991 | |
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The new Political Thinking | |
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The Gorbachev-Reagan Summits | |
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The Bush-Gorbachev Relationship is Slow to Develop | |
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Gorbachev and Europe: our Common Home | |
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Germany Unites | |
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Gorbachev and Eastern Europe | |
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Gorbachev and China | |
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Gorbachev's Domestic Difficulties Cause Problems for Bush | |
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The Gulf War Leads to Joint Superpower Policy | |
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Gorbachev's Problems Mount | |
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The Last Summit | |
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The Attempted Coup and After | |
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Assessment | |
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The Judgement | |
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Introduction | |
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Sources of Hostility Between the Superpowers | |
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Why did America come to Guarantee West European Security? | |
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Why did Russia and America Gradually become Systemic Rivals? | |
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A Hard Lesson for the Superpowers: Empires are Liabilities | |
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Is there a Link between Good Government and Economic Prosperity? | |
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Was the Growth of Nuclear Arsenals Inevitable? | |
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Why did the Cold War end? | |
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America's Changing Doctrine | |
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Was the USA an Imperialist Power? | |
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Documents | |
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Khrushchev and Diversionary Tactics | |
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Khrushchev and China | |
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Kennedy and Vietnam | |
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Kennedy, Khrushchev and Cuba | |
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Kissinger, Brezhnev and Detente | |
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The KGB | |
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The KGB and Italy | |
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The Russians and the Palestinians | |
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Afghanistan | |
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Poland | |
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A Top Adviser's Withering Criticism of Soviet Foreign Policy | |
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Gorbachev's New Thinking | |
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The Reykjavik Summit | |
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Gorbachev, Reagan and SDI | |
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Gorbachev and Mrs Thatcher | |
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Moscow and Fraternal Parties | |
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Further Reading | |
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References | |
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Index | |