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Industrial Organization Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications

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ISBN-10: 1405176326

ISBN-13: 9781405176323

Edition: 4th 2008 (Revised)

Authors: Lynne Pepall, Dan Richards, George Norman

List price: $113.95
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Description:

Industrial organization is the study of imperfect competition - as well as the strategic behavior of firms, the structure of markets, and the interactions between the two. The bestselling textbook, Industrial Organization, now in its fourth edition, uniquely uses the tools of game theory, information economics, contracting issues, and practical examples to examine all facets of industrial organization to enhance students' understanding of real world market events.This new edition includes current research on real business behavior and public policy. A new series of appendices that comprehensively explore relevant econometric issues will provide a more challenging and relevant option for…    
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Book details

List price: $113.95
Edition: 4th
Copyright year: 2008
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated
Publication date: 1/14/2008
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 736
Size: 7.25" wide x 10.00" long x 1.50" tall
Weight: 2.882
Language: English

List of Figures
List of Tables
About the Authors
Preface to the Fourth Edition
Foundations
Industrial Organization: What, How, and Why?
What Is Industrial Organization?
How We Study Industrial Organization
Why? Antitrust and Industrial Organization Theory Summary Problems References Appendix: Excerpts from Key Antitrust Statutes
Basic Microeconomics
Competition versus Monopoly: The Poles of Market Performance
Profit Today versus Profit Tomorrow: Firm Decision-making over Time
Efficiency, Surplus, and Size Relative to the Market Summary Problems References
Market Structure and Market Power
Measuring Market Structure
Measuring Market Power
Empirical Application: Monopoly Power-How Bad Is It? Summary Problems References
Technology and Cost
Production Technology and Cost Functions for the Single-product Firms
Sunk Cost and Market Structure
Costs and Multiproduct Firms
Noncost Determinants of Industry Structure
Empirical Application: Cost Function Estimation-Scale and Scope Economies Summary Problems References
Monopoly Power in Theory and Practice
Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing
Feasibility of Price Discrimination
Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing
Implementing Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing
Product Variety and Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing
Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing and Social Welfare Summary Problems References
Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Non-linear Pricing
First-degree Price Discrimination or Personalized Pricing
Second-degree Price Discrimination or Menu Pricing
Social Welfare with First- and Second-degree Price Discrimination Summary Problems References
Product Variety and Quality Under Monopoly
A Spatial Approach to Horizontal Product Differentiation
Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation
Is There Too Much Product Variety?
Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation with Price Discrimination
Vertical Product Differentiation
Empirical Application: Price Discrimination, Product Variety, and Monopoly versus Competition Summary Problems References Appendix A: Location Choice with Two Shops Appendix B: The Monopolist's Choice of Price When Her Shops Have Different Costs
Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales
Commodity Bundling and Price Discrimination
Required Tie-in Sales
Complementary Goods, Network Externalities, and Monopoly Pricing
Antitrust, Bundling, and Tie-in Sales Summary Problems References Appendix: Formal Proof on the Inefficiency Induced by the Marketing of Complementary Goods by Separate Monopolists
Oligopoly and Strategic Interaction
Static Games and Cournot Competition
Strategic Interaction: Introduction to Game Theory
Dominant and Dominated Strategies
Nash Equilibrium as a Solution Concept
Static Models of Oligopoly: The Cournot Model
Variations on the Cournot Theme: Many Firms and Different Costs
Concentration and Profitability in the Cournot Model Summary Problems References
Price Competition
The Bertrand Duopoly Model
Bertrand Reconsidered
Bertrand in a Spatial Setting
Strategic Complements and Substitutes
Empirical Application: Brand Competition and Consumer Preferences-Evidence from the California Retail Gasoline Market Summary Problems References
Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers
The Stackelberg Model of Quantity Competition
Sequential Price Competition
Credibility of Threats and Na