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| Source Acknowledgments | |
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| Preface and Acknowledgments | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Philosophical Image | |
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| Life and the Search for Philosophical Knowledge | |
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| Plato, Republic | |
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| Philosophical Questioning | |
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| Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy | |
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| Philosophy and Fundamental Images | |
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| Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" | |
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| Philosophy as the Analyzing of Key Concepts | |
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| P.F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics | |
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| Philosophy as Explaining Underlying Possibilities | |
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| Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations | |
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| Metaphysics: Philosophical Images of Being | |
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| How Is the World at all Physical? | |
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| How Real Are Physical Objects? | |
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| Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy | |
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| Are Physical Objects Never Quite as They Appear To Be? | |
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| John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding | |
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| Are Physical Objects Really Only Objects of Thought? | |
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| George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge | |
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| Is Even the Mind Physical? | |
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| D.M. Armstrong, "The Causal Theory of the Mind" | |
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| Is the Physical World All There Is? | |
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| Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia" | |
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| How Does the World Function? | |
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| Is Causation Only a Kind of Regularity? | |
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| David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding | |
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| Is Causation Something Singular and Unanalyzable? | |
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| G.E.M. Anscombe, "Causation and Determination" | |
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| How Do Things Ever Have Qualities? | |
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| How Can Individual Things Have Repeatable Qualities? | |
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| Plato, Parmenides | |
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| How Can Individual Things Not Have Repeatable Qualities? | |
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| D.M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism | |
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| How Are There Any Truths? | |
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| Do Facts Make True Whatever Is True? | |
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| Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" | |
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| Are There Social Facts? | |
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| John Searle, Mind, Language and Society | |
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| Is There Only Personally Decided Truth? | |
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| Plato, Theaetetus | |
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| How Is There a World At All? | |
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| Has the World Been Designed by God? | |
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| David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion | |
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| Is God's Existence Knowable Purely Conceptually? | |
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| St. Anselm, Proslogion | |
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| Has This World Been Actualized by God from Among All Possible Worlds? | |
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| G.W Leibniz, Monadology | |
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| Does This World Exist Because It Has Value Independently of God? | |
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| Nicholas Rescher, Nature and Understanding | |
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| Can Something Have Value in Itself? | |
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| Plato, Euthyphro | |
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| How Are Persons Persons? | |
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| Is Each Person a Union of Mind and Body? | |
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| Ren� Descartes, "Meditation VI" | |
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| Is Self-Consciousness what Constitutes a Person? | |
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| John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding | |
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| How Strictly Does Self-Consciousness Constitute a Person? | |
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| Roderick M. Chisholm, "Identity through Time" | |
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| Are Persons Constituted with Strict Identity At All? | |
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| Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons | |
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| Are We Animals? | |
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| Eric T. Olson, "An Argument for Animalism" | |
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| How Do People Ever Have Free Will and Moral Responsibility? | |
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| Is There No Possibility of Acting Differently To How One Will in Fact Act? | |
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| Aristotle, De Interpretatione | |
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| Could Our Being Entirely Caused Coexist with Our Acting Freely? | |
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| David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding | |
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| Would Being Entirely Caused Undermine Our Personally Constitutive Emotions? | |
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| P.F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment" | |
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| Is a Person Morally Responsible Only for Actions Performed Freely? | |
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| Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility" | |
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| Is Moral Responsibility for a Good Action Different to Moral Responsibility for a Bad Action? | |
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| Susan Wolf, "Asymmetrical Freedom" | |
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| How Could a Person Be Harmed by Being Dead? | |
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| Is It Impossible To Be Harmed by Being Dead? | |
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| Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus" | |
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| Is It Impossible To Be Harmed by Being Dead at a Particular Time? | |
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| Lucretius, De Rerum Natura | |
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| Would Immortality Be Humanly Possible and Desirable? | |
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| Bernard Williams, "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality" | |
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| Can a Person be Deprived of Benefits by Being Dead? | |
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| Fred Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper | |
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| Further Readings for Part II | |
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| Epistemology: Philosophical Images of Knowing | |
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| Can We Understand What It Is to Know? | |
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| Is Knowledge a Supported True Belief? | |
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| Plato, Meno | |
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| When Should a Belief be Supported by Evidence? | |
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| W.K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief" | |
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| Is Knowledge a Kind of Objective Certainty? | |
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| A J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge | |
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| Are All Fallibly Supported True Beliefs Instances of Knowledge? | |
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| Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" | |
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| Must a True Belief Arise Aptly, if it is to be Knowledge? | |
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| Alvin I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing" | |
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| Must a True Belief Arise Reliably, if it is to be Knowledge? | |
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| Alvin I. Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge" | |
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| Where is the Value in Knowing? | |
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| Catherine Z. Elgin, "The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity" | |
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| Is Knowledge Always a Virtuously Derived True Belief? | |
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| Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind | |
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| Can We Ever Know Just through Observation? | |
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| Is All Knowledge Ultimately Observational? | |
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| David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding | |
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| Is There a Problem of Not Knowing that One Is Not Dreaming? | |
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| Ren� Descartes, "Meditation I" | |
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| What Is It Really to be Seeing Something? | |
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| David Lewis, "Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision" | |
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| Is There a Possibility of Being a Mere and Unknowing Brain in a Vat? | |
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| Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History | |
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| Is It Possible to Observe Directly the Objective World? | |
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| John McDowell, "The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument" | |
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| Can We Ever Know Innately? | |
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| Is It Possible to Know Innately Some Geometrical or Mathematical Truths? | |
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| Plato, Meno | |
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| Is There No Innate Knowledge At All? | |
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| John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding | |
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| Can We Ever Know Just through Reflection? | |
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| Is All Knowledge Ultimately Reflective? | |
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| Ren� Descartes, Discourse on Method | |
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| Can Reflective Knowledge Be Substantive and Informative? | |
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| Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason | |
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| Is All Apparently Reflective Knowledge Ultimately Observational? | |
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| John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic | |
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| Is Scientific Reflection Our Best Model for Understanding Reflection? | |
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| C.S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" and "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" | |
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| Are Some Necessities Known through Observation, Not Reflection? | |
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| Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity | |
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| Can We Know in Other Fundamental Ways? | |
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| Is Knowing-How a Distinct Way of Knowing? | |
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| Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing How and Knowing That" | |
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| Is Knowing One's Intention-in-Action a Distinct Way of Knowing? | |
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| G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention | |
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| Is Knowing via What Others Say or Write a Distinct Way of Knowing? | |
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| Jennifer Lackey, "Knowing from Testimony" | |
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| Is Knowing through Memory a Distinct Way of Knowing? | |
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| Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind | |
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| Can We Fundamentally Fail Ever To Know? | |
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| Are None of our Beliefs More Justifiable than Others? | |
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| Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism | |
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| Are None of Our Beliefs Immune from Doubt? | |
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| Ren� Descartes, "Meditation I" | |
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| Are We Unable Ever To Extrapolate Justifiedly Beyond Our Observations? | |
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| David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding | |
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| Can Skeptical Arguments Be Escaped? | |
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| Can We Know at Least Our Conscious Mental Lives? | |
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| Rene Descartes, "Meditation II" | |
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| Can We Know Some Fundamental Principles by Common Sense? | |
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| Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man | |
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| Do We Know a Lot, but Always Fallibly? | |
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| Karl R. Popper, "On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance" | |
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| Is It Possible to have Knowledge even when Not Knowing that One Is Not a Brain in a Vat? | |
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| Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations | |
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| Further Readings for Part III | |