Securities Against Misrule Juries, Assemblies, Elections

Name: Securities Against Misrule Juries, Assemblies, Elections
Price: 21.45 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9781107649958

ISBN-10: 1107649951

ISBN-13: 9781107649958

Edition: 2013

Authors: Jon. Elster

List price: $45.95

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Description:

This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social-choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views,…

Book details

List price: $45.95
Copyright year: 2013
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 4/29/2013
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 332
Size: 6.06" wide x 9.25" long x 0.71" tall
Weight: 1.034
Language: English

Jon Elster is Professor of Rationalitï¿½ et sciences sociales at College de France, and Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Sciences at Columbia University. He is author of Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective .



Introduction



The normative study of collective decision making



Ignorance, secrecy, and publicity in jury decision making



A dialogue with Bentham



The optimal design of constituent assemblies



Cross-voting: a study in failure



Conclusion