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Preface | |
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Acknowledgments | |
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Introduction | |
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A Brief History of Economic Dominance | |
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Systemic Manifestations of US Economic Dominance | |
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Defining Dominance and Power | |
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Quantification and Validation of Economic Dominance | |
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Identifying the Potential Attributes of Economic Dominance | |
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Occam Razorization: Narrowing the List | |
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Measuring the Three Determinants | |
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Validating Economic Dominance | |
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Weighting and Constructing the Index of Economic Dominance | |
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Results: Economic Dominance in the Past | |
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Quantifying Currency Dominance | |
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Definition | |
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Benefits and Costs to the Country Issuing the Reserve Currency | |
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Short History | |
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What Determines Reserve Currency Status? | |
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A Regression Analysis of Reserve Currency Status | |
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Forces Driving Dominance: Convergence and Gravity | |
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Convergence of the Previously Poor | |
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Convergence of the Populous, Previously Poor | |
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Projecting Numbers: Background Analytics | |
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Results | |
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Caveat | |
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Back to History: Economics Catches Up with Demographics | |
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Conclusion | |
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Projecting GDP Growth Based on Purchasing Power Parity and Market Exchange Rates | |
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Trade Projections Based on the Gravity Model | |
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Projecting Economic and Currency Dominance | |
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Economic Dominance in the Future | |
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The Future of the Dollar and the Renminbi | |
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The Renminbi When the Chips Are Down | |
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Conclusion | |
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Robustness of the Index of Economic Dominance | |
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A Historical Perspective on China's Distinctive Dominance | |
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Precocious or Premature: Can a Not-the-Puchest China Be Dominant? | |
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China's Trade and Openness Outcomes in Historical Power Perspective | |
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Chinese Mercantilism in Historical Perspective | |
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Guarding Against Rash Prophesying | |
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China's Growth: Repeating Mistakes? | |
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Looking Back | |
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Conclusion | |
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Economic Cooperation with a Rising China | |
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How Many Country Groupings Are There in 2011? Historical Parallels | |
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Prospects for Cooperation Leading Up to Chinese Hegemony | |
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China is the New Raison d'�tre for Reviving Multilateralism | |
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Limits to the Efficacy of Trade Reciprocity with a Dominant China | |
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Alternative Approaches: Promiscuous and Hostile Bilateralism | |
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Asian-Centered Regionalism as a Medium | |
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Impediments ro Revived Multilateralism | |
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A "China Round" for Tethering China | |
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Conclusion | |
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Postscript America Resurgent or America Vulnerable? | |
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References | |
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Index | |
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Tables | |
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Roles of an international currency | |
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Determinants of reserves, 1899-2009 | |
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Convergence and growth rates over time, 1870-2008 | |
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Growth projections in a convergence scenario, 2010-30 | |
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Economic weight in 2010 and 2030 under the convergence scenario | |
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Relative rankings of countries under the convergence scenario with GDP measured in purchasing power parity dollars | |
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Relative rankings of countries under the convergence scenario with GDP measured in dollars | |
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"Share of world trade under the convergence scenario, selected countries, 2010 and 2030 | |
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Exports between countries as a share of total world exports, 2008 and 2030 | |
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Demographic and economic weight of the populous poor, 1500-2030 | |
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UK, US, Chinese, and European shares of world GDP measured in purchasing power parity dollars, 1870-2030 | |
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UK, US, Chinese, and European shares of world trade, 1870-2030 | |
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UK, US, Chinese, and European shares of world net capital exports, 1870-2030 | |
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UK, US, Chinese, and European GDP per capita, 1870,1950, and 2030 | |
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Trade patterns of economically dominant powers in history | |
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Comparing mercantilist outcomes and instruments of economic powers in history | |
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Twenty-year growth rate of selected economies after reaching 25 percent of US GDP per capita | |
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Long-run growth rates of economies before and after reaching 25 percent of US GDP per capita | |
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Who is in charge? 1870-2030 | |