| |
| |
| Preface | |
| |
| |
| |
| Introduction | |
| |
| |
| What Is Philosophy of Mind? | |
| |
| |
| Metaphysical Preliminaries | |
| |
| |
| Mind-Body Supervenience | |
| |
| |
| Materialism and Physicalism | |
| |
| |
| Varieties of Mental Phenomena | |
| |
| |
| Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism | |
| |
| |
| Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism | |
| |
| |
| Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments | |
| |
| |
| Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes | |
| |
| |
| The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument | |
| |
| |
| Immaterial Minds in Space? | |
| |
| |
| Substance Dualism and Property Dualism | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism | |
| |
| |
| The Cartesian Theater and the "Beetle in the Box" | |
| |
| |
| What Is Behavior? | |
| |
| |
| Logical Behaviorism: A Positivist Argument | |
| |
| |
| A Behavioral Translation of "Paul Has a Toothache" | |
| |
| |
| Difficulties with Behavioral Definitions | |
| |
| |
| Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior? | |
| |
| |
| Ontological Behaviorism | |
| |
| |
| The Real Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior | |
| |
| |
| Behaviorism in Psychology | |
| |
| |
| Why Behavior Matters to Mind | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory | |
| |
| |
| Mind-Brain Correlations | |
| |
| |
| Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations | |
| |
| |
| The Argument from Simplicity | |
| |
| |
| Explanatory Arguments for Psychoneural Identity | |
| |
| |
| An Argument from Mental Causation | |
| |
| |
| Against Psychoneural Identity Theory | |
| |
| |
| Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism | |
| |
| |
| Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind | |
| |
| |
| Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions | |
| |
| |
| Functionalism and Behaviorism | |
| |
| |
| Turing Machines | |
| |
| |
| Physical Realizers of Turing Machines | |
| |
| |
| Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims | |
| |
| |
| Machine Functionalism: Further Issues | |
| |
| |
| Can Machines Think? The Turing Test | |
| |
| |
| Computationalism and the "Chinese Room" | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism | |
| |
| |
| The Ramsey-Lewis Method | |
| |
| |
| Choosing an Underlying Psychology | |
| |
| |
| Functionalism as Physicalism: Psychological Reality | |
| |
| |
| Objections and Difficulties | |
| |
| |
| Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mental Causation | |
| |
| |
| Agency and Mental Causation | |
| |
| |
| Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism | |
| |
| |
| Psychophysical Laws and "Anomalous Monism" | |
| |
| |
| Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? | |
| |
| |
| Counterfactuals to the Rescue? | |
| |
| |
| Physical Causal Closure and the "Exclusion Argument" | |
| |
| |
| The "Supervenience Argument" and Epiphenomenalism | |
| |
| |
| Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mental Content | |
| |
| |
| Interpretation Theory | |
| |
| |
| The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics | |
| |
| |
| Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach | |
| |
| |
| Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism | |
| |
| |
| The Metaphysics of Wide Content States | |
| |
| |
| Is Narrow Content Possible? | |
| |
| |
| Two Problems for Content Externalism | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| What Is Consciousness? | |
| |
| |
| Some Views on Consciousness | |
| |
| |
| Nagel and His Inscrutable Bats | |
| |
| |
| Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness | |
| |
| |
| Consciousness and Subjectivity | |
| |
| |
| Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perception or Thought? | |
| |
| |
| Transparency of Experience and Qualia Representationalism | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem | |
| |
| |
| The "Explanatory Gap" and the "Hard Problem" | |
| |
| |
| Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? | |
| |
| |
| Closing the Explanatory Gap: Reduction and Reductive Explanation | |
| |
| |
| Functional Analysis and Reductive Explanation | |
| |
| |
| Consciousness and Brain Science | |
| |
| |
| What Mary, the Supervision Scientist, Didn't Know | |
| |
| |
| The Limits of Physicalism | |
| |
| |
| For Further Reading | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| References | |
| |
| |
| Index | |