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Laying the Foundations | |
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Introduction to Strategic Reasoning | |
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Who Wants To Be a Game Theorist? | |
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A Sampling of Strategic Situations | |
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Whetting Your Appetite: The Game of Concentration | |
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Psychological Profile of a Player | |
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Preferences | |
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Beliefs | |
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How Do Players Differ? | |
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Playing the Gender Pronoun Game | |
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Building A Model of A Strategic Situation | |
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Introduction | |
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Extensive Form Games: Perfect Information | |
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Baseball | |
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Galileo Galilei and the Inquisition | |
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Haggling at an Auto Dealership | |
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Extensive Form Games: Imperfect Information | |
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Mugging | |
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Court | |
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The Iraq War and Weapons of Mass Destruction | |
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What is a Strategy? | |
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Strategic Form Games | |
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Tosca | |
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Competition for Elected Office | |
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The Science 84 Game | |
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Moving from the Extensive Form and Strategic Form | |
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Baseball | |
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Galileo Galilei and the Inquisition | |
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Haggling at an Auto Dealership | |
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Going from the Strategic Form to the Extensive Form | |
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Common Knowledge | |
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A Few More Issues in Modeling Games | |
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Solving Strategic form Games | |
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Eliminating the Impossible: Solving A Game When Rationality is Common Knowledge | |
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Introduction | |
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Solving a Game When Players Are Rational | |
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Strict Dominance | |
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White Flight and Racial Segregation in Housing | |
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Banning Cigarette Advertising on Television | |
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Weak Dominance | |
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Bidding at an Auction | |
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The Proxy Bid Paradox at eBay | |
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Solving a Game When Players Are Rational and Players Know Players Are Rational | |
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Team-Project Game | |
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Existence of God Game | |
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Boxed Pigs Game | |
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Solving a Game When Rationality is Common Knowledge | |
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The Doping Game: Is it Rational for Athletes to Use Steroids? | |
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Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies | |
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Appendix: Strict and Weak Dominance | |
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Appendix: Rationalizability (Advanced) | |
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Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two or Three Players | |
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Defining Nash Equilibrium | |
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Classic Two-Player Games | |
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Prisoners' Dilemma | |
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A Coordination Game: Driving Conventions | |
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A Game of Coordination and Conflict: Telephone | |
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An Out-guessing Game: Rock-Paper-Scissors | |
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Conflict and Mutual Interest in Games | |
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Best-Reply Method | |
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Three-player Games | |
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American Idol Fandom | |
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Voting: Sincere or Devious? | |
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Promotion and Sabotage | |
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Foundations of Nash Equilibrium | |
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Relationship to Rationality is Common Knowledge | |
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The Definition of a Strategy, Revisited | |
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Appendix: Nash Equilibrium | |
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Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete N-Player Games | |
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Introduction | |
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Symmetric Games | |
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The Sneetches | |
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Airline Security | |
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Operating Systems: Mac or Windows? | |
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Applying for an Internship | |
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Asymmetric Games | |
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Entry into a Market | |
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Civil Unrest | |
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Selecting Among Nash Equilibria | |
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Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games | |
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Introduction | |
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Solving for Nash Equilibria without Calculus | |
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Price Competition with Identical Products | |
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Neutralizing Price Competition with Price-Matching Guarantees | |
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Competing for Elected Office | |
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Solving for Nash Equilibria with Calculus (optional) | |
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Price Competition with Differentiated Products | |
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Tragedy of the Commons: Extinction of the Wooly Mammoth | |
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Charitable Giving and the Power of Matching Grants | |
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Keep 'Em Guessing: Randomized Strategies | |
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Police Patrols and the Drug Trade | |
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Making Decisions under Uncertainty | |
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Probability and Expectation | |
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Preferences over Uncertain Options | |
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Ordinal vs. Cardinal Payoffs | |
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Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium | |
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Back on the Beat | |
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Some General Properties of a Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies | |
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Examples | |
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Avranches Gap in World War II | |
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Entry into a Market | |
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Advanced Examples | |
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Penalty Kick in Soccer | |
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Slash'em Up: Friday the 13th | |
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Bystander Effect | |
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Games of Pure Conflict and Cautious Behavior | |
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Appendix: Formal Description of Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies | |
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Solving Extensive Form Games | |
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Taking Turns: Sequential Games of Perfect Information | |
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Introduction | |
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Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | |
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Examples | |
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Cuban Missile Crisis | |
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Enron and Prosecutorial Prerogative | |
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Racial Discrimination and Sports | |
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Waiting Games: Pre-emption and Attrition | |
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Pre-emption | |
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War of Attrition | |
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Do People Reason Using Backward Induction? | |
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Experimental Evidence and Backward Induction | |
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A Logical Paradox with Backward Induction | |
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Taking Turns in the Dark: Sequential Games of Imperfect Information | |
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Introduction | |
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Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium | |
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British Intelligence | |
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Examples | |
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OS/2 | |
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Agenda Control in the Senate | |
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Commitment | |
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Entry Deterrence | |
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Managerial Contracts and Competition: East India Trade in the 17th Century | |
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Games of Incomplete Information | |
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I Know Something you Don't Know: Games with Private Information | |
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Introduction | |
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A Game of Incomplete Information: The Munich Agreement | |
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Bayesian Games and Bayes-Nash Equilibrium | |
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Gunfight in the Wild West | |
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When All Players Have Private Information: Auctions | |
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Independent Private Values and Shading Your Bid | |
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Common Value and the Winner's Curse | |
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Voting on Committees and Juries | |
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Strategic Abstention | |
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Sequential Voting in the Jury Room | |
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Appendix: A More Formal Definition of Bayes-Nash Equilibrium | |
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Appendix: First Price Sealed Bid Auction with a Continuum of Types | |
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Independent Private Values | |
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Common Value | |
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What you do Tells Me Who You Are: Signaling Games | |
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Introduction | |
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Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium | |
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Management Trainee | |
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Examples | |
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Lemons and the Market for Used Cars | |
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Courtship | |
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Brinkmanship | |
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Appendix: Bayes' Rule and Updating Beliefs | |
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Lies and the Lying Liars that Tell Them: Cheap Talk Games | |
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Introduction | |
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Communication in a Game-Theoretic World | |
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Signaling Information | |
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Defensive Medicine | |
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Stock Recommendations | |
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Signaling Intentions | |
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Pre-play Communication in Theory | |
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Pre-play communication in Practice | |
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Repeated Games | |
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Playing Forever: Repeated Interaction with Infinitely-Lived Players | |
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Trench Warfare in World War I | |
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Constructing a Repeated Game | |
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Trench Warfare: Finite Horizon | |
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Trench Warfare: Infinite Horizon | |
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Some Experimental Evidence for the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma | |
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Appendix: Present Value of a Payoff Stream | |
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Appendix: Dynamic Programming | |
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Cooperation and Reputation: Applications of Repeated Interaction with Infinitely-Lived Players | |
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Introduction | |
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A Menu of Punishments | |
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Price-Fixing | |
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Temporary Reversion to Moderate Rates | |
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Price Wars: Temporary Reversion to Low Rates | |
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A More Equitable Punishment | |
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Quid Pro Quo | |
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U.S. Congress and Pork Barrel Spending | |
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Vampire Bats and Reciprocal Altruism | |
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Reputation | |
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Lending to Kings | |
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Henry Ford and the $5 Workday | |
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Imperfect Monitoring and Anti-Ballistic Missiles | |
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Interaction in Infinitely-Lived Institutions | |
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Introduction | |
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Cooperation with Overlapping Generations | |
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Tribal Defense | |
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Taking Care of Your Elderly Parents | |
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Political Parties and Lame Duck Presidents | |
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Cooperation in a Large Population | |
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EBay | |
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Medieval Law Merchant | |
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Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology | |
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Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies | |
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Introducing Evolutionary Game Theory | |
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Hawk-Dove Conflict | |
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Evolutionarily Stable Strategy | |
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"Stayin' Alive" on a Cowpat | |
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Properties of an ESS | |
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Side-blotched Lizards | |
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Multi-population Games | |
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Parental Care | |
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Evolution of Spite | |
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Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Replicator Dynamics | |
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Introduction | |
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Replicator Dynamics and Hawk-Dove | |
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General Definition of the Replicator Dynamic | |
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ESS and Attractors of the Replicator Dynamic | |
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Examples of Strategic Situations | |
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Stag Hunt | |
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Handedness in Baseball | |
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Evolution of Cooperation | |