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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Abbreviations | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Evolution of Terrorism as a Strategic Threat | |
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| A Word About Scope and Terms | |
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| The Conceptual Framework | |
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| Case Selection | |
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| Overview of Chapters | |
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| Decapitation: Catching or Killing the Leader | |
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| what decapitation Means | |
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| The Arrest of Top Leaders | |
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| Abimael Guzman and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) | |
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| Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | |
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| Mickey McKevitt and the Real Irish Republican Army | |
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| Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo | |
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| Assassination or "Targeted Killing" | |
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| The Philippines' Abu Sayyaf | |
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| Russia and Chechen Leaders | |
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| Israel's "Targeted Killings" | |
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| How Decapitation Ends Terrorism | |
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| Negotiations: Transition toward a Legitimate Political Process | |
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| why Government Negotiate | |
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| Why Groups Negotiate | |
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| Case Studies of Negotiations | |
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| The Northern Ireland Peace Process | |
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| Analysis of the Agreement | |
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| The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process | |
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| Terrorism and the Talks | |
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| The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers) | |
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| Analysis of the Failure | |
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| Promising and Unpromising Circumstances for Negotiation | |
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| Stalemate | |
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| Strong Leadership | |
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| Sponsors | |
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| Suicide Campaigns | |
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| Splintering | |
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| Spoilers | |
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| Setting and Story | |
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| How Negotiations End Terrorism | |
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| Success: Achieving the Objective | |
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| What Does "Success" Mean? | |
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| Survival | |
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| Achievement of Objectives | |
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| Perpetuating Terrorism: Tactical or "Process" Goals | |
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| Ending Terrorism: Strategic or"Outcome" Goals | |
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| Cases of Success | |
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| Irgun Zvai Le'umi (Irgun or IZL) | |
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| The African National Congress and Umkhonto | |
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| Other Notable Cases | |
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| How Success Ends Terrorism | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Failure: Imploding, Provoking a Backlash, or Becoming Marginalized | |
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| Implosion: Mistakes, Burnout, and Collapse | |
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| Failure to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation | |
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| Generational Patterns: Left-Wing Groups In The 1970S | |
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| Generational Patterns: Right-Wing Groups In The 1990S | |
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| Infighting and Fractionalization | |
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| Loss of Operational Control | |
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| Accepting an Exit | |
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| Marginalization: Diminishing Popular Support | |
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| The Ideology Becomes Irrelevant | |
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| Loss of Contact with "the People" | |
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| Targeting Errors and Backlash | |
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| How Failure Ends Terrorism | |
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| Repression: Crushing Terrorism with Force | |
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| Analyzing The Strategies of Terrorism | |
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| Case Studies of Repression | |
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| Russia and Narodnaya Volya | |
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| Peru and Sendero Luminoso | |
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| Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | |
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| Uruguay and the Tupamaros | |
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| Russia and Chechnya | |
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| Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1928-1966 | |
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| How Repression Ends Terrorism | |
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| Reorientation: Transitioning to Another Modus Operandi | |
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| Criminality and Terrorism | |
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| Colombia and the FARC | |
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| The Philippines and Abu Sayyaf | |
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| Insurgency and Terrorism | |
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| Algeria and the G1A | |
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| Terrorism as a Catalyst for Major War | |
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| India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Separatist Groups | |
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| Outdates Paradigms, Practical Implications | |
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| How War Ends Terrorism | |
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| How Al-Qaeda Ends: The Relevance and Irrelevance of History | |
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| Is Al-Qaeda Unique? | |
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| Resilient Structure | |
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| Methods of Radicalization and Recruitment | |
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| Means of Support | |
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| Means of Communication | |
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| The Relevance and Irrelevance of History for Al-Qaeda: Applying the Framework | |
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| Decapitation:Capturing or Killing the Leaders | |
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| Negotiations: Talking to Al-Qaeda or Its Associates | |
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| Success: Achieving Al-Qaeda's Objectives | |
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| Failure through Implosion | |
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| Failure through Diminishment of Popular Support | |
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| Repression: Crushing Al-Qaeda with Force | |
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| Reorientation: Transitioning to Other Means | |
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| Al-Qaeda's Decline and Demise | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Understanding How Terrorism Ends | |
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| Appendix: Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns | |
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| Notes | |
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| Selected Bibliography | |
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| Index | |