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Game Theory Evolving A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction - Second Edition

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ISBN-10: 0691140510

ISBN-13: 9780691140513

Edition: 2nd 2009 (Revised)

Authors: Herbert Gintis

List price: $63.00
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Book details

List price: $63.00
Edition: 2nd
Copyright year: 2009
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 2/15/2009
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 408
Size: 7.01" wide x 10.16" long x 1.04" tall
Weight: 2.068
Language: English

Preface
Probability Theory
Basic Set Theory and Mathematical Notation
Probability Spaces
De Morgan's Laws
Interocitors
The Direct Evaluation of Probabilities
Probability as Frequency
Craps
A Marksman Contest
Sampling
Aces Up
Permutations
Combinations and Sampling
Mechanical Defects
Mass Defection
House Rules
The Addition Rule for Probabilities
A Guessing Game
North Island, South Island
Conditional Probability
Bayes' Rule
Extrasensory Perception
Les Cinq Tiroirs
Drug Testing
Color Blindness
Urns
The Monty Hall Game
The Logic of Murder and Abuse
The Principle of Insufficient Reason
The Greens and the Blacks
The Brain and Kidney Problem
The Value of Eyewitness Testimony
When Weakness Is Strength
The Uniform Distribution
Laplace's Law of Succession
From Uniform to Exponential
Bayesian Decision Theory
The Rational Actor Model
Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting
The Expected Utility Principle
Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function
The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model
Game Theory: Basic Concepts
Big John and Little John
The Extensive Form
The Normal Form
Mixed Strategies
Nash Equilibrium
The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory
Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
Throwing Fingers
Battle of the Sexes
The Hawk-Dove Game
The Prisoner's Dilemma
Eliminating Dominated Strategies
Dominated Strategies
Backward Induction
Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies
Subgame Perfection
Stackelberg Leadership
The Second-Price Auction
The Mystery of Kidnapping
The Eviction Notice
Hagar's Battles
Military Strategy
The Dr. Strangelove Game
Strategic Voting
Nuisance Suits
An Armaments Game
Football Strategy
Poker with Bluffing
The Little Miss Muffet Game
Cooperation with Overlapping Generations
Dominance-Solvable Games
Agent-based Modeling
Why Play a Nash Equilibrium?
Modeling the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Review of Basic Concepts
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria
Price Matching as Tacit Collusion
Competition on Main Street
Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgets
The Tobacco Market
The Klingons and the Snarks
Chess: The Trivial Pastime
No-Draw, High-Low Poker
An Agent-based Model of No-Draw, High-Low Poker
The Truth Game
The Rubinstein Bargaining Model
Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience
Bargaining with One Outside Option
Bargaining with Dual Outside Options
Huey, Dewey, and Louie Split a Dollar
Twin Sisters
The Samaritan's Dilemma
The Rotten Kid Theorem
The Shopper and the Fish Merchant
Pure Coordination Games
Pick Any Number
Pure Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence
Introductory Offers
Web Sites (for Spiders)
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
The Algebra of Mixed Strategies
Lions and Antelope
A Patent Race
Tennis Strategy
Preservation of Ecology Game
Hard Love
Advertising Game