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Preface | |
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Introduction | |
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Introduction to the Theory | |
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A Survey of Auction Theory | |
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Introduction | |
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Plan of this chapter | |
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The standard auction types | |
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The basic models of auctions | |
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Bidding in the standard auctions | |
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Terminology | |
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Early Literature | |
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Introduction to the Recent Literature | |
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The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues | |
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Risk-Aversion | |
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Correlation and Affiliation | |
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Asymmetries | |
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Private value differences | |
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Almost-common-values | |
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Information advantages | |
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Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders | |
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Endogenous entry of bidders | |
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The value of additional bidders | |
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Information aggregation with large numbers of bidders | |
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Unknown number of bidders | |
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Collusion | |
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Multi-Unit Auctions | |
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Optimal auctions | |
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Simultaneous auctions | |
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Sequential auctions | |
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Efficient auctions | |
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Royalties, Incentives Contracts, and Payments for Quality | |
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Double Auctions, etc. | |
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Double auctions | |
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Related two-sided trading mechanisms | |
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Other Topics | |
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Budget constraints | |
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Externalities between bidders | |
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Jump bidding | |
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The war of attrition | |
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Competing auctioneers | |
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Testing the Theory | |
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Conclusion | |
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Appendix | |
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The Revenue Equivalence Theorem | |
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Marginal Revenues | |
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Affiliated Signals | |
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Examples Using the Uniform Distribution | |
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Bibliography | |
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Afterword | |
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Exercises | |
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Applications to Other Areas of Economics | |
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Why Every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory | |
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Introduction | |
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Using Auction-Theoretic Tools in Economics: The Revenue Equivalence Theorem | |
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Comparing litigation systems | |
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The war of attrition | |
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Queuing and other "all-pay" applications | |
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Solving for equilibrium behavior: market crashes and trading "frenzies" | |
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Translating Looser Analogies From Auctions into Economics: Ascending vs. (First-Price) Sealed-Bid Auctions | |
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Internet sales vs. dealer sales | |
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Anglo-Dutch auctions, a theory of rationing, and patent races | |
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Exploiting Deeper Connections between Auctions and Economics: Marginal Revenues | |
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Applying Auction Theory to Price-Setting Oligopolies | |
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Marginal-cost pricing is NOT the unique Bertrand equilibrium | |
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The value of new consumers | |
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Information aggregation in perfect competition | |
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Applying Auction Theory (and Economics) to Auction Markets | |
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Important auction markets | |
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Applying economics to auction design | |
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2.7 Conclusion | |
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Appendix | |
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Comparing Litigation Systems | |
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Direct Proof of Monopoly-Theoretic Version of Proposition in Section 2.4 | |
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Practical Auction Design | |
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What Really Matters in Auction Design | |
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Introduction | |
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Collusion | |
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Entry Deterrence and Predation | |
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Other Pitfalls | |
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Reserve prices | |
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Political problems | |
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Loopholes | |
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Credibility of the rules | |
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Market structure | |
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When is auction design less important? | |
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Solutions | |
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Making the ascending auction more robust | |
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Using sealed-bid auctions | |
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The Anglo-Dutch auction | |
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Antitrust | |
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Tailoring Auction Design To The Context | |
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Conclusion | |
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Using and Abusing Auction Theory | |
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Introduction | |
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The Received Auction Theory | |
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Relevance of the received theory | |
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The Elementary Economic Theory that Matters | |
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Entry | |
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Collusion | |
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Robustness to Political Pressures | |
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Economic similarity- | |