Auctions Theory and Practice

ISBN-10: 0691119252
ISBN-13: 9780691119250
Edition: 2004
Authors: Paul Klemperer
List price: $52.50 Buy it from $10.13
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Description: Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up  More...

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Book details

List price: $52.50
Copyright year: 2004
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 3/28/2004
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 264
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 0.792

Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practiceprovides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.

Preface
Introduction
Introduction to the Theory
A Survey of Auction Theory
Introduction
Plan of this chapter
The standard auction types
The basic models of auctions
Bidding in the standard auctions
Terminology
Early Literature
Introduction to the Recent Literature
The Basic Analysis of Optimal Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, and Marginal Revenues
Risk-Aversion
Correlation and Affiliation
Asymmetries
Private value differences
Almost-common-values
Information advantages
Entry Costs and the Number of Bidders
Endogenous entry of bidders
The value of additional bidders
Information aggregation with large numbers of bidders
Unknown number of bidders
Collusion
Multi-Unit Auctions
Optimal auctions
Simultaneous auctions
Sequential auctions
Efficient auctions
Royalties, Incentives Contracts, and Payments for Quality
Double Auctions, etc.
Double auctions
Related two-sided trading mechanisms
Other Topics
Budget constraints
Externalities between bidders
Jump bidding
The war of attrition
Competing auctioneers
Testing the Theory
Conclusion
Appendix
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
Marginal Revenues
Affiliated Signals
Examples Using the Uniform Distribution
Bibliography
Afterword
Exercises
Applications to Other Areas of Economics
Why Every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory
Introduction
Using Auction-Theoretic Tools in Economics: The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
Comparing litigation systems
The war of attrition
Queuing and other "all-pay" applications
Solving for equilibrium behavior: market crashes and trading "frenzies"
Translating Looser Analogies From Auctions into Economics: Ascending vs. (First-Price) Sealed-Bid Auctions
Internet sales vs. dealer sales
Anglo-Dutch auctions, a theory of rationing, and patent races
Exploiting Deeper Connections between Auctions and Economics: Marginal Revenues
Applying Auction Theory to Price-Setting Oligopolies
Marginal-cost pricing is NOT the unique Bertrand equilibrium
The value of new consumers
Information aggregation in perfect competition
Applying Auction Theory (and Economics) to Auction Markets
Important auction markets
Applying economics to auction design
2.7 Conclusion
Appendix
Comparing Litigation Systems
Direct Proof of Monopoly-Theoretic Version of Proposition in Section 2.4
Practical Auction Design
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Introduction
Collusion
Entry Deterrence and Predation
Other Pitfalls
Reserve prices
Political problems
Loopholes
Credibility of the rules
Market structure
When is auction design less important?
Solutions
Making the ascending auction more robust
Using sealed-bid auctions
The Anglo-Dutch auction
Antitrust
Tailoring Auction Design To The Context
Conclusion
Using and Abusing Auction Theory
Introduction
The Received Auction Theory
Relevance of the received theory
The Elementary Economic Theory that Matters
Entry
Collusion
Robustness to Political Pressures
Economic similarity-

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