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List of Figures and Tables | |
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Preface and Acknowledgments | |
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Overview | |
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What Is Game Theory? | |
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What Can You Do with Game Theory? | |
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Four Problems in Political Science | |
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Why Model? | |
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The Rational Choice Approach to Social Modeling | |
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Utility Theory | |
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The Concept of Rationality | |
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How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions? | |
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An Example: Nixon's Christmas Bombing | |
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Certainty, Risk, and Uncertainty | |
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Utility Theory under the Condition of Risk | |
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Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theory | |
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Utility Functions and Types of Preferences | |
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A Simple Example: The Calculus of Deterrence | |
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Another Simple Example: The Decision to Vote | |
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Why Might Utility Theory Not Work? | |
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Specifying a Game | |
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Formalizing a Situation: Deterrence in the Cuban Missile Crisis | |
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Games in Extensive Form | |
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Games in Strategic Form | |
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Classical Game Theory | |
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Defining the Terms of Classical Game Theory | |
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Domination, Best Replies, and Equilibrium | |
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Mixed Strategies | |
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The Minmax Theorem and Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games | |
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Characteristics of Nash Equilibria | |
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Nash Equilibria and Common Conjectures | |
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Rationalizability | |
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Political Reform in Democracies | |
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Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of Elections | |
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A Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory | |
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Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection | |
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Backwards Induction | |
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Subgame Perfection | |
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Sophisticated Voting | |
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Agenda Control | |
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Legislative Rules and Structure-Induced Equilibria | |
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The Rubinstein Bargaining Model | |
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Bargaining in Legislatures | |
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Why Might Backwards Induction Yield Counterintuitive Results? | |
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Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | |
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Bayes's Theorem | |
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The Preference for Biased Information | |
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Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | |
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Nuclear Deterrence | |
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More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria | |
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Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies | |
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Perfect Equilibrium | |
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Sequential Equilibrium | |
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Deterrence and the Signaling of Resolve | |
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"Why Vote?" Redux | |
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Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs | |
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Signaling Games | |
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The Informational Role of Congressional Committees | |
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Bargaining under Incomplete Information | |
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Deterrence and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs | |
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An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefs | |
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"Cheap Talk" and Coordination | |
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Repeated Games | |
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Thinking about Repetition: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma | |
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Folk Theorems | |
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Finite Repeated Games: The Chain Store Paradox | |
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Stationarity | |
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Retrospective Voting and Electoral Control | |
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Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? | |
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How Do Formal Models Increase Our Knowledge? | |
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The Weaknesses of Game Theory | |
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How Does One Build a Model? | |
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Appendix 1: Basic Mathematical Knowledge | |
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Algebra | |
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Set Theory | |
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Relations and Functions | |
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Probability Theory | |
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Limits | |
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Differential Calculus | |
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Partial Derivatives and Lagrange Multipliers | |
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Integral Calculus | |
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The Idea of a Mathematical Proof | |
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Answers to Selected Problems | |
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Notes | |
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Glossary of Terms in Game Theory | |
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Bibliography | |
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Index | |