Game Theory for Applied Economists

ISBN-10: 0691003955
ISBN-13: 9780691003955
Edition: 1992
Authors: Robert Gibbons
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Description: This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and  More...

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Book details

List price: $52.50
Copyright year: 1992
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 8/2/1992
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 288
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.75" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.298
Language: English

This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Static Games of Complete Information
Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium
Normal-Form Representation of Games
Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin
Applications
Cournot Model of Duopoly
Bertrand Model of Duopoly
Final-Offer Arbitration
The Problem of the Commons
Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibriutn
Mixed Strategies
Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Dynamic Games of Complete Information
Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information
Theory: Backwards Induction
Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm
Sequential Bargaining
Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
Theory: Subgame Perfection
Bank Runs
Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition
Tournaments
Repeated Games
Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games
Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games
Collusion between Cournot Duopolists
Efficiency Wages
Time-Consistent Monetary Policy
Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
Extensive-Form Representation of Games
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin
Static Games of Incomplete Information
Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information
Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games
Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Applications
Mixed Strategies Revisited
An Auction
A Double Auction
The Revelation Principle
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Signaling Games
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games
Job-Market Signaling
Corporate Investment and Capital Structure
Monetary Policy
Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Cheap-Talk Games
Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Index

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