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| Static Games of Complete Information | |
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| Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Normal-Form Representation of Games | |
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| Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies | |
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| Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin | |
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| Applications | |
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| Cournot Model of Duopoly | |
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| Bertrand Model of Duopoly | |
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| Final-Offer Arbitration | |
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| The Problem of the Commons | |
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| Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibriutn | |
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| Mixed Strategies | |
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| Existence of Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Dynamic Games of Complete Information | |
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| Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information | |
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| Theory: Backwards Induction | |
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| Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm | |
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| Sequential Bargaining | |
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| Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information | |
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| Theory: Subgame Perfection | |
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| Bank Runs | |
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| Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition | |
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| Tournaments | |
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| Repeated Games | |
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| Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games | |
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| Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games | |
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| Collusion between Cournot Duopolists | |
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| Efficiency Wages | |
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| Time-Consistent Monetary Policy | |
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| Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information | |
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| Extensive-Form Representation of Games | |
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| Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin | |
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| Static Games of Incomplete Information | |
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| Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | |
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| An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information | |
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| Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games | |
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| Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Applications | |
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| Mixed Strategies Revisited | |
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| An Auction | |
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| A Double Auction | |
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| The Revelation Principle | |
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| Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information | |
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| Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Signaling Games | |
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| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games | |
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| Job-Market Signaling | |
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| Corporate Investment and Capital Structure | |
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| Monetary Policy | |
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| Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Cheap-Talk Games | |
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| Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information | |
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| Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia | |
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| Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Index | |