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| Preface | |
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| Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game | |
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| The Normal Form Game | |
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| Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes | |
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| The Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior | |
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| Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance | |
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| Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game | |
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| The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game | |
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| The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction | |
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| A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment | |
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| Subgame Perfection | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation | |
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| Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept | |
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| The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept | |
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| Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result | |
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| Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling | |
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| Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of | |
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| Renegotiation | |
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| Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation | |
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| Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information | |
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| Signaling and Screening | |
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| Modeling Nonverifiable Information | |
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| Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules | |
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| Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules | |
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| Screening and the Role of Legal Rules | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Reputation and Repeated Games | |
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| Backwards Induction and Its Limits | |
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| Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems | |
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| Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models | |
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| Collective Action and the Role of Law | |
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| Embedded Games | |
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| Understanding the Structure of Large Games | |
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| Collective Action and Private Information | |
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| Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking | |
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| Herd Behavior | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Noncooperative Bargaining | |
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| Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade | |
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| Legal Rules as Exit Options | |
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| Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations | |
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| Collective Bargaining and Exit Options | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Bargaining and Information | |
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| Basic Models of the Litigation Process | |
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| Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages | |
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| Information and Selection Bias | |
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| Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information | |
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| Summary | |
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| Bibliographic Notes | |
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| Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law | |
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| Notes | |
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| References | |
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| Glossary | |
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| Index | |