Preface | |
The Theory of Knowledge | p. 1 |
Plato: The Ascent to Knowledge (from the Republic) | p. 6 |
Plato: Innate Ideas (from the Meno) | p. 17 |
Skepticism | p. 25 |
Rene Descartes: Global Skepticism | p. 28 |
David Hume: Skepticism Regarding the Senses | p. 31 |
G. E. Moore: A Defense of Common Sense | p. 41 |
Keith Lehrer: Why Not Skepticism? | p. 48 |
Norman Malcolm: Two Types of Knowledge | p. 56 |
Our Knowledge of the External World | p. 65 |
John Locke: A Representational Theory of Perception | p. 69 |
George Berkeley: An Idealist Theory of Knowledge | p. 83 |
W. T. Stace: Science and the Physical World: A Defense of Phenomenalism | p. 91 |
C. H. Whiteley: Phenomenalism: Its Grounds and Difficulties | p. 95 |
Bertrand Russell: A Defense of Representationalism | p. 103 |
John R. Searle: The Intentionality of Perception | p. 108 |
Charles Landesman: Why Nothing Has Color: Color Skepticism | p. 121 |
The Analysis of Knowledge | p. 129 |
Edmund L. Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? | p. 134 |
Alvin I. Goldman: A Causal Theory of Knowing | p. 137 |
Keith Lehrer and Thomas D. Paxson, Jr.: Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief | p. 146 |
Gilbert Harman: Inference to the Best Explanation | p. 151 |
Alvin I. Goldman: Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge | p. 163 |
William W. Rozeboom: Why I Know So Much More Than You Do | p. 175 |
Theories of Justification (I): Foundationalism and Coherentism | p. 187 |
Rene Descartes: Classical Foundationalism | p. 192 |
Robert Audi: Contemporary Foundationalism | p. 206 |
Laurence BonJour: A Critique of Foundationalism | p. 214 |
Laurence BonJour: Holistic Coherentism | p. 226 |
Richard Fumerton: A Critique of Coherentism | p. 241 |
Ernest Sosa: The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge | p. 246 |
Robert Audi: Fallibilist Foundationalism and Holistic Coherentism | p. 263 |
David Annis: A Contextual Theory of Epistemic Justification | p. 280 |
Justification (II): Externalism and Internalism | p. 289 |
Alvin I. Goldman: Reliabilism: What Is Justified Belief? | p. 292 |
Keith Lehrer: A Critique of Externalism | p. 306 |
W. V. Quine: Epistemology Naturalized | p. 320 |
Jaegwon Kim: What Is "Naturalized Epistemology"? | p. 329 |
John L. Pollock: Epistemic Norms | p. 341 |
Alvin Plantinga: Justification in the 20th Century | p. 351 |
A Priori Knowledge | p. 369 |
Immanuel Kant: A Priori Knowledge | p. 373 |
A. J. Ayer: An Empiricist Critique of a Priori Knowledge | p. 381 |
A. C. Ewing: In Defense of A Priori Knowledge | p. 389 |
W. V. Quine: Two Dogmas of Empiricism | p. 395 |
H. P. Grice and Peter F. Strawson: In Defense of a Dogma | p. 408 |
Roderick Chisholm: Truths of Reason | p. 414 |
The Justification of Induction | p. 429 |
David Hume: The Problem of Induction | p. 432 |
Bertrand Russell: On Induction | p. 438 |
F. L. Will: Will the Future Be Like the Past? | p. 442 |
Hans Reichenbach: The Pragmatic Justification of Induction | p. 450 |
Peter F. Strawson: Dissolving the Problem of Induction | p. 455 |
Nelson Goodman: The New Riddle of Induction | p. 459 |
Other Minds | p. 465 |
Bertrand Russell: The Analogy Argument for Other Minds | p. 468 |
H. H. Price: The Argument from Language Understanding | p. 471 |
Norman Malcolm: The Behavioral Criterion and the Problem of Other Minds | p. 482 |
Michael Levin: Why We Believe in Other Minds | p. 488 |
The Ethics of Belief | p. 499 |
W. K. Clifford: The Ethics of Belief | p. 502 |
William James: The Will to Believe | p. 506 |
Jack Meiland: What Ought We to Believe? | p. 514 |
Louis P. Pojman: Believing, Willing, and the Ethics of Belief | p. 525 |
Richard Feldman: Epistemic Obligations | p. 544 |
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