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List of figures | |
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List of tables | |
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List of boxes | |
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Acknowledgements | |
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Introduction | |
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Summary of the argument and the main findings | |
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Outline of the book | |
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Lessons for political science and European politics | |
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Development of the European Parliament | |
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Powers of the European Parliament | |
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Power to control the executive: a hybrid model | |
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Power to make legislation: from a lobbyist to a co-legislator | |
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Political parties in the European Parliament: a 'two-plus-several' party system | |
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The electoral disconnection | |
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The dataset: roll-call votes in the European Parliament | |
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Conclusion | |
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Democracy, transaction costs and political parties | |
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Citizen-delegate democracy | |
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Party-based democracy | |
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Parties in legislative politics and the making of public policy | |
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Parties and electoral politics | |
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Parliaments without strong parties: a history of failure | |
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Implications for the European Parliament | |
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Conclusion | |
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Ideological not territorial politics | |
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Political conflict, indivisibilities, externalities and redistribution | |
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Solving political conflicts | |
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The cleavage theory of democratic politics | |
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Implications for the European Parliament | |
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Conclusion | |
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Decentralised governance to territorial entities and sectors | |
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Participation | |
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Participation in the European Parliament: The costs and benefits of voting | |
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Variations in participation rates across time, political group and country | |
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Explaining the patterns | |
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Conclusion: politics determines participation | |
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Trends in party cohesion | |
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Theories of party cohesion | |
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Measuring cohesion in the European Parliament | |
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Main trends: growing party voting and declining national voting | |
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Determinants of party cohesion in the European Parliament | |
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Variables | |
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Results | |
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Conclusion: Growing policy-making power leads to growing party cohesion | |
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Agenda-setting and cohesion | |
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Agenda-setting and political parties | |
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The agenda cartel theory of parties | |
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Agenda-setting in the European Parliament: external and internal 'cartels' | |
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Propositions about agenda-setting and party cohesion in the European Parliament | |
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Descriptive evidence of agenda-setting and policy influence | |
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Statistical analysis | |
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Variables | |
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Results | |
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Conclusion: agenda control alone cannot explain party discipline | |
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Who controls the MEPs? | |
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MEPs: agents with two principals | |
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Voting with and against the European and national parties | |
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Analysis of MEP voting defection in the Fifth Parliament | |
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Variables | |
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Results | |
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Relative importance of European and national parties in all five parliaments | |
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Conclusion: European parties from national party actions | |
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Competition and coalition formation | |
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Theories of party competition and coalition formation | |
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Patterns of coalitions in the European Parliament | |
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Determinants of coalition formation | |
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Variables | |
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Results | |
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Conclusion: an increasingly competitive party system | |
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Dimensions of politics | |
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Dimensions of conflict in EU politics | |
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Estimating MEPs' ideal points from roll-call votes | |
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Spatial maps of the five elected European Parliaments | |
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Interpretation of the meaning of the dimensions | |
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Variables | |
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Results | |
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Conclusion: Normal politics in a territorially divided polity | |
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Investiture and censure of the Santer Commission | |
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Formation and termination of governments and the case of the EU | |
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The Santer Commission: from nomination to resignation | |
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Analysis: MEP behaviour in the investiture and censure of the Commission | |
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Variables | |
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Results | |
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Conclusion: Government-opposition politics arrives in the European Parliament | |
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The Takeover Directive | |
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A short history of the Takeover Directive | |
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Explaining MEP voting on the Takeover Directive: nationality or party? | |
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Analysis of MEP behaviour on the Takeover Directive | |
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Variables | |
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Results | |
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Conclusion: parties and ideology matter, even when national interests interfere | |
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Conclusion | |
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Bibliography | |
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Index | |