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List of Figures | |
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List of Tables | |
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Acknowledgments | |
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Introduction | |
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The Weakness of Parties | |
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Committee Government | |
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An Outline of the Book | |
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The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees | |
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Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis | |
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Self Selection | |
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Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests | |
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Accommodation of Assignment Requests | |
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Accommodation of Transfer Requests | |
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The Routinization of the Assignment Process | |
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What of Norms in the Assignment Process? | |
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Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution | |
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Summary | |
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The Seniority System in Congress | |
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Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View | |
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Reconsidering the Standard View | |
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The Empirical Evidence | |
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Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule | |
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Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution | |
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Conclusion | |
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Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees | |
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The Previous Literature | |
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Data and Methodology | |
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Results | |
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The Representativeness Thesis | |
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Conclusion | |
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A Theory of Organization | |
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Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas | |
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Collective Dilemmas | |
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Central Authority: The Basics | |
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Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary | |
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Multiperiod Considerations | |
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Problems with Central Authority | |
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Conclusion | |
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A Theory of Legislative Parties | |
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The Reelection Goal | |
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Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies | |
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Party Leadership | |
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Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder | |
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Conclusion | |
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Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions | |
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On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress | |
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Party Voting: Trends Since 1980 | |
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Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s | |
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Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes | |
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Conclusion | |
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Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments | |
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Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments | |
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Assignments to Control Committees | |
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Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees | |
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Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995 | |
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Assignment Success of Freshmen | |
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Conclusion | |
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Contingents and Parties | |
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A Model of Partisan Selection | |
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Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative? | |
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Results | |
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Conclusion | |
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Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power | |
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The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda | |
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The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem | |
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Limits on the Scheduling Power | |
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Committee Agendas and the Speaker | |
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Intercommittee Logrolls | |
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Coalitional Stability | |
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Critiques and Rejoinders | |
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Conclusion | |
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Controlling the Legislative Agenda | |
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The Majority Party and the Committee System | |
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The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda | |
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The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy | |
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Comments on the Postwar House | |
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Conclusion | |
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Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses | |
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A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences | |
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Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes | |
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The Scheduling Power | |
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Bibliography | |
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Author Index | |
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Subject Index | |