Skip to content

Legislative Leviathan Party Government in the House

Best in textbook rentals since 2012!

ISBN-10: 0521694094

ISBN-13: 9780521694094

Edition: 2nd 2007 (Revised)

Authors: Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins

List price: $38.99
Blue ribbon 30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee!
what's this?
Rush Rewards U
Members Receive:
Carrot Coin icon
XP icon
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!

Description:

The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for…    
Customers also bought

Book details

List price: $38.99
Edition: 2nd
Copyright year: 2007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 3/5/2007
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 328
Size: 7.17" wide x 9.09" long x 0.79" tall
Weight: 0.946
Language: English

List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
The Weakness of Parties
Committee Government
An Outline of the Book
The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees
Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
Self Selection
Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests
Accommodation of Assignment Requests
Accommodation of Transfer Requests
The Routinization of the Assignment Process
What of Norms in the Assignment Process?
Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution
Summary
The Seniority System in Congress
Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View
Reconsidering the Standard View
The Empirical Evidence
Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule
Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution
Conclusion
Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees
The Previous Literature
Data and Methodology
Results
The Representativeness Thesis
Conclusion
A Theory of Organization
Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas
Collective Dilemmas
Central Authority: The Basics
Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary
Multiperiod Considerations
Problems with Central Authority
Conclusion
A Theory of Legislative Parties
The Reelection Goal
Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies
Party Leadership
Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder
Conclusion
Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions
On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
Party Voting: Trends Since 1980
Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s
Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
Conclusion
Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments
Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
Assignments to Control Committees
Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees
Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995
Assignment Success of Freshmen
Conclusion
Contingents and Parties
A Model of Partisan Selection
Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative?
Results
Conclusion
Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power
The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda
The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
Limits on the Scheduling Power
Committee Agendas and the Speaker
Intercommittee Logrolls
Coalitional Stability
Critiques and Rejoinders
Conclusion
Controlling the Legislative Agenda
The Majority Party and the Committee System
The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda
The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy
Comments on the Postwar House
Conclusion
Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
The Scheduling Power
Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index