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Introduction to G�del's Theorems

ISBN-10: 0521674530
ISBN-13: 9780521674539
Edition: 2007
Authors: Peter Smith
List price: $36.99
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Description: In 1931, the young Kurt Gdel published his First Incompleteness Theorem, which tells us that, for any sufficiently rich theory of arithmetic, there are some arithmetical truths the theory cannot prove. This remarkable result is among the most  More...

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Book details

List price: $36.99
Copyright year: 2007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 7/26/2007
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 376
Size: 6.75" wide x 9.75" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.650
Language: English

In 1931, the young Kurt Gdel published his First Incompleteness Theorem, which tells us that, for any sufficiently rich theory of arithmetic, there are some arithmetical truths the theory cannot prove. This remarkable result is among the most intriguing (and most misunderstood) in logic. Gdel also outlined an equally significant Second Incompleteness Theorem. How are these Theorems established, and why do they matter? Peter Smith answers these questions by presenting an unusual variety of proofs for the First Theorem, showing how to prove the Second Theorem, and exploring a family of related results (including some not easily available elsewhere). The formal explanations are interwoven with discussions of the wider significance of the two Theorems. This book will be accessible to philosophy students with a limited formal background. It is equally suitable for mathematics students taking a first course in mathematical logic.

Pete Smith is a Technical Architect and data warehouse specialist with a wide range of expertise from application analysis, design and development through to database design, administration and tuning. This experience covers 19 years in the IT industry, 14 of which are specifically on Oracle platforms and demonstrates a high degree of longevity and familiarity with the Oracle database server and associated products. Qualified to degree level, Pete has worked for many years as an independent Oracle consultant and, more recently, in a senior position as a Principal consultant with Oracle UK; Pete now works for a specialist UK IT consultancy.

Preface
What Godel's Theorems say
Basic arithmetic
Incompleteness
More incompleteness
Some implications?
The unprovability of consistency
More implications?
What's next?
Decidability and enumerability
Functions
Effective decidability, effective computability
Enumerable sets
Effective enumerability
Effectively enumerating pairs of numbers
Axiomatized formal theories
Formalization as an ideal
Formalized languages
Axiomatized formal theories
More definitions
The effective enumerability of theorems
Negation-complete theories are decidable
Capturing numerical properties
Three remarks on notation
A remark about extensionality
The language L[subscript A]
A quick remark about truth
Expressing numerical properties and relations
Capturing numerical properties and relations
Expressing vs. capturing: keeping the distinction clear
The truths of arithmetic
Sufficiently expressive languages
More about effectively enumerable sets
The truths of arithmetic are not effectively enumerable
Incompleteness
Sufficiently strong arithmetics
The idea of a 'sufficiently strong' theory
An undecidability theorem
Another incompleteness theorem
Interlude: Taking stock
Comparing incompleteness arguments
A road-map
Two formalized arithmetics
BA, Baby Arithmetic
BA is negation complete
Q, Robinson Arithmetic
Q is not complete
Why Q is interesting
What Q can prove
Systems of logic
Capturing less-than-or-equal-to in Q
Adding '[less than or equal]' to Q
Q is order-adequate
Defining the [Delta subscript 0], [Sigma subscript 1] and [Pi subscript 1] wffs
Some easy results
Q is [Sigma subscript 1]-complete
Intriguing corollaries
Proving Q is order-adequate
First-order Peano Arithmetic
Induction and the Induction Schema
Induction and relations
Arguing using induction
Being more generous with induction
Summary overview of PA
Hoping for completeness?
Where we've got to
Is PA consistent?
Primitive recursive functions
Introducing the primitive recursive functions
Defining the p.r. functions more carefully
An aside about extensionality
The p.r. functions are computable
Not all computable numerical functions are p.r.
Defining p.r. properties and relations
Building more p.r. functions and relations
Further examples
Capturing p.r. functions
Capturing a function
Two more ways of capturing a function
Relating our definitions
The idea of p.r. adequacy
Q is p.r. adequate
More definitions
Q can capture all [Sigma subscript 1] functions
L[subscript A] can express all p.r. functions: starting the proof
The idea of a [beta]-function
L[subscript A] can express all p.r. functions: finishing the proof
The p.r. functions are [Sigma subscript 1]
The adequacy theorem
Canonically capturing
Interlude: A very little about Principia
Principia's logicism
Godel's impact
Another road-map
The arithmetization of syntax
Godel numbering
Coding sequences
Term, Atom, Wff, Sent and Prf are p.r.
Some cute notation
The idea of diagonalization
The concatenation function
Proving that Term is p.r.
Proving that Atom and Wff are p.r.
Proving Prf is p.r.
PA is incomplete
Reminders
'G is true if and only if it is unprovable'
PA is incomplete: the semantic argument
'G is of Goldbach type'
Starting the syntactic argument for incompleteness
[omega]-incompleteness, [omega]-inconsistency
Finishing the syntactic argument
'Godel sentences' and what they say
Godel's First Theorem
Generalizing the semantic argument
Incompletability
Generalizing the syntactic argument
The First Theorem
Interlude: About the First Theorem
What we've proved
The reach of Godelian incompleteness
Some ways to argue that G[subscript T] is true
What doesn't follow from incompleteness
What does follow from incompleteness?
Strengthening the First Theorem
Broadening the scope of the incompleteness theorems
True Basic Arithmetic can't be axiomatized
Rosser's improvement
1-consistency and [Sigma subscript 1]-soundness
The Diagonalization Lemma
Provability predicates
An easy theorem about provability predicates
G and Prov
Proving that G is equivalent to Prov(G)
Deriving the Lemma
Using the Diagonalization Lemma
The First Theorem again
An aside: 'Godel sentences' again
The Godel-Rosser Theorem again
Capturing provability?
Tarski's Theorem
The Master Argument
The length of proofs
Second-order arithmetics
Second-order arithmetical languages
The Induction Axiom
Neat arithmetics
Introducing PA[subscript 2]
Categoricity
Incompleteness and categoricity
Another arithmetic
Speed-up again
Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's conjecture
Taking stock
Goodstein's Theorem
Isaacson's conjecture
Ever upwards
Ancestral arithmetic
Godel's Second Theorem for PA
Defining Con
The Formalized First Theorem in PA
The Second Theorem for PA
On [omega]-incompleteness and [omega]-consistency again
How should we interpret the Second Theorem?
How interesting is the Second Theorem for PA?
Proving the consistency of PA
The derivability conditions
More notation
The Hilbert-Bernays-Lob derivability conditions
G, Con, and 'Godel sentences'
Incompletability and consistency extensions
The equivalence of fixed points for Prov
Theories that 'prove' their own inconsistency
Lob's Theorem
Deriving the derivability conditions
Nice theories
The second derivability condition
The third derivability condition
Useful corollaries
The Second Theorem for weaker arithmetics
Jeroslow's Lemma and the Second Theorem
Reflections
The Second Theorem: the story so far
There are provable consistency sentences
What does that show?
The reflection schema: some definitions
Reflection and PA
Reflection, more generally
'The best and most general version'
Another route to accepting a Godel sentence?
Interlude: About the Second Theorem
'Real' vs 'ideal' mathematics
A quick aside: Godel's caution
Relating the real and the ideal
Proving real-soundness?
The impact of Godel
Minds and computers
The rest of this book: another road-map
[Mu]-Recursive functions
Minimization and [Mu]-recursive functions
Another definition of [Mu]-recursiveness
The Ackermann-Peter function
The Ackermann-Peter function is [Mu]-recursive
Introducing Church's Thesis
Why can't we diagonalize out?
Using Church's Thesis
Undecidability and incompleteness
Q is recursively adequate
Nice theories can only capture recursive functions
Some more definitions
Q and PA are undecidable
The Entscheidungsproblem
Incompleteness theorems again
Negation-complete theories are recursively decidable
Recursively adequate theories are not recursively decidable
What's next?
Turing machines
The basic conception
Turing computation defined more carefully
Some simple examples
'Turing machines' and their 'states'
Turing machines and recursiveness
[Mu]-Recursiveness entails Turing computability
[Mu]-Recursiveness entails Turing computability: the details
Turing computability entails [Mu]-recursiveness
Generalizing
Halting problems
Two simple results about Turing programs
The halting problem
The Entscheidungsproblem again
The halting problem and incompleteness
Another incompleteness argument
Kleene's Normal Form Theorem
Kleene's Theorem entails Godel's First Theorem
The Church-Turing Thesis
From Euclid to Hilbert
1936 and all that
What the Church-Turing Thesis is not
The status of the Thesis
Proving the Thesis?
The project
Vagueness and the idea of computability
Formal proofs and informal demonstrations
Squeezing arguments
The first premiss for a squeezing argument
The other premisses, thanks to Kolmogorov and Uspenskii
The squeezing argument defended
To summarize
Looking back
Further reading
Bibliography
Index

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