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Delegating Powers A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers

ISBN-10: 052166960X
ISBN-13: 9780521669603
Edition: 1999
List price: $44.99 Buy it from $26.08
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Description: David Epstein and Sharyn OHalloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the  More...

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Book details

List price: $44.99
Copyright year: 1999
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 11/13/1999
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 340
Size: 5.75" wide x 8.50" long x 1.25" tall
Weight: 1.210
Language: English

David Epstein and Sharyn OHalloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and OHalloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers.

List of Figures and Tables
Preface
Paths of Policy Making
The Politics of Military Base Closings
Delegating Powers: The Puzzle
A Transaction Cost Politics Approach
Delegation and Broad Themes in American Politics
Outline of the Book
Choosing How to Decide
Legislative Organization
Delegation and Oversight
Why Delegate?
Transaction Cost Politics
Lessons from the Theory of the Firm
A Theory of Transaction Cost Politics
The Political Hold-up Problem
The Decision to Delegate
The Elements of Policy Making
Equilibrium Actions and Outcomes
Testable Predictions
Data and Postwar Trends
Data Sample
Delegation Ratio
Constraints
Total Discretion
Postwar Trends in Executive Discretion
Delegation and Congressional-Executive Relations
Divided Government: The Debate
Discretion and Divided Government
Roll Calls over Delegation
Vetoes and Delegation
The Structure of Delegation: To Whom Do You Delegate?
Testing for Strategic Delegation
Implications of Divided Government for Public Policy
Delegation and Legislative Organization
Perspectives on Legislative Organization
Committee Outliers in a System of Separate Powers
Committees, Parties, and Delegation
Legislative Procedures and Executive Discretion
Summary
Delegation and Issue Areas
Introduction
Issues, Delegation, and Public Laws
Issue Areas and Information
Delegation and Distributive Politics
Summary
Conclusion
Summary of Results
The Grand Regression: Integrating Theories of American Political Institutions
Separation of Powers in the United States
An Afterword on Comparative Institutions
Presidential Systems
Parliamentary Systems
Comparative Policy-Making Structures
Appendices
Proofs from Formal Model in Chapter 4
Sample of Public Laws
Sample Coding Sheet
Coding Rules for Discretion
Gridlock Interval and Other Measures of Interbranch Conflict, 1947-1992
Coding Rules for Roll-Call Votes
Committee Hearings Data
References
Index

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