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| List of Figures and Tables | |
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| Preface | |
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| Paths of Policy Making | |
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| The Politics of Military Base Closings | |
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| Delegating Powers: The Puzzle | |
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| A Transaction Cost Politics Approach | |
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| Delegation and Broad Themes in American Politics | |
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| Outline of the Book | |
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| Choosing How to Decide | |
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| Legislative Organization | |
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| Delegation and Oversight | |
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| Why Delegate? | |
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| Transaction Cost Politics | |
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| Lessons from the Theory of the Firm | |
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| A Theory of Transaction Cost Politics | |
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| The Political Hold-up Problem | |
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| The Decision to Delegate | |
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| The Elements of Policy Making | |
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| Equilibrium Actions and Outcomes | |
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| Testable Predictions | |
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| Data and Postwar Trends | |
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| Data Sample | |
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| Delegation Ratio | |
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| Constraints | |
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| Total Discretion | |
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| Postwar Trends in Executive Discretion | |
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| Delegation and Congressional-Executive Relations | |
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| Divided Government: The Debate | |
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| Discretion and Divided Government | |
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| Roll Calls over Delegation | |
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| Vetoes and Delegation | |
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| The Structure of Delegation: To Whom Do You Delegate? | |
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| Testing for Strategic Delegation | |
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| Implications of Divided Government for Public Policy | |
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| Delegation and Legislative Organization | |
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| Perspectives on Legislative Organization | |
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| Committee Outliers in a System of Separate Powers | |
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| Committees, Parties, and Delegation | |
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| Legislative Procedures and Executive Discretion | |
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| Summary | |
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| Delegation and Issue Areas | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Issues, Delegation, and Public Laws | |
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| Issue Areas and Information | |
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| Delegation and Distributive Politics | |
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| Summary | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Summary of Results | |
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| The Grand Regression: Integrating Theories of American Political Institutions | |
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| Separation of Powers in the United States | |
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| An Afterword on Comparative Institutions | |
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| Presidential Systems | |
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| Parliamentary Systems | |
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| Comparative Policy-Making Structures | |
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| Appendices | |
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| Proofs from Formal Model in Chapter 4 | |
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| Sample of Public Laws | |
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| Sample Coding Sheet | |
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| Coding Rules for Discretion | |
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| Gridlock Interval and Other Measures of Interbranch Conflict, 1947-1992 | |
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| Coding Rules for Roll-Call Votes | |
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| Committee Hearings Data | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |