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| Acknowledgements | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Locke and the nature of language | |
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| Introduction | |
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| What Locke says | |
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| Meaning and signification | |
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| Problems about communication | |
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| Words and sentences | |
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| Locke's less disputed assumptions | |
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| Frege on Sense and reference | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Psychologism and the Context Principle | |
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| Frege and logic | |
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| Frege's mature system (i): reference | |
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| Frege's mature system (ii): Sense | |
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| Two further uses of the notion of Sense | |
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| Questions about Sense | |
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| Sense and the Basic Worry | |
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| Russell on definite descriptions | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The problems | |
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| Russell's solution in outline | |
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| Russell's solution in detail | |
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| Strawson on definite descriptions | |
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| Donnellan on referential and attributive uses of descriptions | |
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| Russellian defences | |
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| Russell beyond descriptions | |
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| Kripke on proper names | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Kripke's target | |
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| Kripke's objections (i): simple considerations | |
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| Kripke's objections (ii): epistemic and modal considerations | |
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| Defences of the description theory | |
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| Sense and direct reference | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Natural-kind terms | |
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| Introduction | |
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| A Lockean view of natural-kind terms: the individualist version | |
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| A Lockean view without individualism | |
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| How can there be Kripke-Putnam natural-kind terms? | |
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| How can natural-kind terms be rigid designators? | |
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| Quine on de re and de dicto modality | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Quine's three grades of modal involvement | |
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| Referential opacity and Leibniz's law | |
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| Referential opacity and the three grades | |
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| Quine's logical problem with de re modality | |
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| Quine's metaphysical worries about de re modality | |
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| Reference and propositional attitudes | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Quine's problem | |
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| Quine's proposed solution | |
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| Perry and the essential indexical | |
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| The problems for Quine's solution | |
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| Consequences | |
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| The semantics of propositional attitudes | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Kripke, names, necessity and propositional attitudes | |
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| Kripke's Pierre | |
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| Referential solutions to the puzzle | |
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| A Fregean response | |
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| Davidson's proposal | |
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| Can Davidson's proposal solve Kripke's puzzle? | |
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| Davidson on truth and meaning | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Meanings as entities | |
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| Tarski's 'definition' of truth | |
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| Davidson's use of Tarski | |
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| The obvious objections to Davidson's proposal | |
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| Truth and the possibility of general semantics | |
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| One final worry | |
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| Quine and Davidson on translation and interpretation | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Quine and radical translation | |
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| Davidson and radical interpretation | |
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| Statements of meaning and prepositional attitudes | |
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| Theories of meaning and speakers' knowledge | |
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| How fundamental is radical interpretation? | |
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| Quine on the indeterminacy of translation | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Two dogmas of empiricism' | |
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| Indeterminacy and inscrutability | |
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| Resisting Quine on indeterminacy: some simple ways | |
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| Austin on speech acts | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Performative utterances | |
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| Towards a general theory of speech acts | |
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| Truth and performatives | |
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| Issues for a theory of speech acts | |
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| Grice on meaning | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Grice's overall strategy | |
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| Sympathetic objections to Grice's account of speaker-meaning | |
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| Sympathetic objections to Grice's account of expression-meaning | |
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| An unsympathetic objection to Grice's account of expression-meaning | |
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| An unsympathetic objection to Grice's account of speaker-meaning | |
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| After Grice | |
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| Kripke on the rule-following paradox | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The sceptical challenge | |
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| The 'sceptical solution' | |
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| A community-based response | |
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| Can dispositionalism be defended? | |
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| Anti-reductionism and radical interpretation | |
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| Wittgenstein on the Augustinian picture | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Augustinian picture | |
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| The Anti-Metaphysical interpretation | |
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| The Quasi-Kantian interpretation | |
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| Worries about these Wittgensteinian views | |
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| Glossary | |
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| Works cited | |
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| Index | |