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| Preface | |
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| Foreword | |
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| Getting to Work | |
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| Politics Sets the Stage | |
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| Designing for Multiple Goals | |
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| Substitutes and Complements | |
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| New Zealand's Rights Auction | |
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| Better Auction Designs | |
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| The FCC Design and Its Progeny | |
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| Comparing Seller Revenues | |
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| The Academic Critics | |
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| Resale and the Coase Theorem | |
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| Mechanism Design Theory | |
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| Theory and Experiment | |
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| Practical Concerns | |
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| Plan for This Book | |
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| The Mechanism Design Approach | |
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| Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms | |
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| Formulation | |
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| Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies | |
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| Balancing the Budget | |
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| Uniqueness | |
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| Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction | |
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| Practical Disadvantages | |
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| Monotonicity Problems | |
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| The Merger-Investment Disadvantage | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence | |
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| Hotelling's Lemma | |
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| The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form | |
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| Quasi-linear Payoffs | |
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| Holmstrom's Lemma | |
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| The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem | |
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| Myerson's Lemma | |
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| Revenue Equivalence Theorems | |
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| The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem | |
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| The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems | |
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| Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing Auctions | |
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| The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem | |
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| Sequential Auctions and Weber's Martingale Theorem | |
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| Matthews Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences | |
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| The Single Crossing Conditions | |
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| The Monotonic Selection Theorem | |
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| The Sufficiency Theorem | |
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| The Constraint Simplification Theorem | |
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| The Mirrlees-Spence Representation Theorem | |
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| Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies | |
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| The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price | |
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| The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction | |
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| The War of Attrition Auction | |
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| The All-Pay Auction | |
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| Revenue Comparisons in the Benchmark Model | |
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| Payoff Equivalence without Revenue Equivalence | |
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| Budget Constraints | |
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| Endogenous Quantities | |
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| Correlated Types | |
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| Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions | |
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| Myerson's Theorem | |
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| Bulow-Klemperer Theorem | |
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| The Irregular Case | |
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| Auctions with Weak and Strong Bidders | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Interdependence of Types and Values | |
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| Which Models and Assumptions are "Useful"? | |
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| Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types | |
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| Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private | |
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| Types Are Statistically Independent | |
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| Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions | |
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| Wilson's Drainage Tract Model | |
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| Equilibrium | |
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| Profits and Revenues | |
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| Bidder Information Policy | |
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| Seller Information Policy | |
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| Correlated Types and Interdependent Values | |
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| Affiliation | |
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| The Milgrom-Weber Ascending Auction Models | |
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| The (Second-Price) Button Auction with Minimal Information | |
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| The Button Auction with Maximal Information | |
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| Some Revenue Comparisons | |
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| First-Price Auctions | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Auctions in Context | |
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| The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant | |
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| Symmetric Models with Costly Entry | |
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| Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry | |
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| Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions | |
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| Setting the Reserve Price | |
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| Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors | |
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| Pre-qualifying Bidders | |
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| Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices | |
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| Buy Prices | |
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| Asymmetric Models: Devices to Promote Competition | |
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| Example of Set-asides | |
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| Example of Bidding Credits | |
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| Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes | |
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| Premium Auctions | |
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| Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design | |
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| After the Bidding Ends | |
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| Bankruptcy and Non-performance | |
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| Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Multi-Unit Auctions | |
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| Uniform Price Auctions | |
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| Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions | |
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| Demand Reduction | |
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| Low-Price Equilibria | |
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| Simultaneous Ascending Auctions | |
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| The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and the Walrasian Tatonnement | |
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| Clock Auctions | |
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| Strategic Incentives in Uniform Price Auctions | |
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| The Basic Clock Auction Model | |
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| The Alternating-Move Clock Auction | |
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| Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding | |
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| Vickrey Auctions and the Monotonicity Problems | |
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| Bidders' Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs | |
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| Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle | |
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| When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core? | |
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| Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes | |
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| Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes | |
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| Bernheim-Whinston First-Price Package Auctions | |
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| Formulation | |
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| Profit-Target Strategies | |
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| Equilibrium and the Core | |
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| Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions | |
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| The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets | |
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| Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes | |
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| Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium | |
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| The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes | |
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| The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Author Index | |
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| Subject Index | |