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Mechanism Design A Linear Programming Approach

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ISBN-10: 0521179467

ISBN-13: 9780521179461

Edition: 2011

Authors: Rakesh V. Vohra

List price: $47.95
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Book details

List price: $47.95
Copyright year: 2011
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 5/9/2011
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 184
Size: 5.98" wide x 8.90" long x 0.71" tall
Weight: 0.594
Language: English

Introduction
Outline
Arrow's Theorem and Its Consequences
The Integer Program
General Domains
Social Choice Functions
Strategic Candidacy
Mechanisms and Revelation
Network Flow Problem
Graphs
Network Flow Problem
Flow Decomposition
The Shortest-Path Polyhedron
Interpreting the Dual
Infinite Networks
Incentive Compatibility
Notation
Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility
2-Cycle Condition
Convex Type Spaces
Convex Valuations
Roberts's Theorem
Revenue Equivalence
A Demand-Rationing Example
The Classical Approach
Interdependent Values
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
Efficiency
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
Combinatorial Auctions
The Core
Ascending Auctions
Primal-Dual Algorithm
Incentives
Subgradient Algorithm
Gross Substitutes
An Impossibility
A Recipe
Revenue Maximization
What Is a Solution?
One-Dimensional Types
A Formulation
Optimal Mechanism for Sale of a Single Object
Polyhedral Approach
Ironing and Extreme Points
From Expected Allocations to the Allocation Rule
Correlated Types
The Classical Approach
Budget Constraints
The Continuous Type Case
Asymmetric Types
Bargaining
Multidimensional Types
Wilson's Example
Capacity-Constrained Bidders
Rationalizability
The Quasilinear Case
The General Case
References
Index