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| Preface to the Dover Edition | |
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| Preface | |
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| Introductory Note | |
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| List of Tables | |
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| List of Figures | |
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| International Relations Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Saddlepoints | |
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| Information in Games | |
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| Two-Person Zero-Sum Games without Saddlepoints | |
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| Pure and Mixed Strategies | |
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| Interpretation of Mixed Strategies | |
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| Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games | |
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| Prisoner's Dilemma and the Theory of Metagames | |
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| Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis | |
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| Summary and Conclusion | |
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| Qualitative Voting Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Voting Procedures | |
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| Sincere Voting | |
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| Straightforward Strategies and Voting Procedures | |
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| Equilibrium Choices and Vulnerability | |
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| Desirable Strategies and Equilibria | |
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| The Relationship between Desirable and Admissible Strategies | |
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| Sophisticated Voting | |
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| Coalitions and Information | |
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| Voting on Voting Procedures | |
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| The Paradox of Voting | |
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| Empirical Examples | |
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| Summary and Conclusion | |
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| Quantitative Voting Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Requirements for a Voting System of Proportional Representation | |
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| Rules that Meet the Requirements | |
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| Interdependence of the Requirements | |
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| The Effects of Size | |
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| Information and the Choice of Strategies | |
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| Empirical Examples | |
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| Summary and Conclusion | |
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| Vote-Trading Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| What the General Possibility Theorem Precludes | |
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| Judgments about Vote Trading | |
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| Definitions and Assumptions | |
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| Sincere and Insincere Voting | |
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| Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading | |
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| Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading | |
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| The Consequences of Refusing to Trade | |
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| The Consequences of Forming Coalitions | |
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| Conditions Limiting Vote Trading | |
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| Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading | |
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| Summary and Conclusion | |
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| Voting Power | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Shapley-Shubik Index of Voting Power | |
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| The Banzhaf Index of Voting Power | |
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| Coalition Models of the Two Power Indices | |
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| Calculation of the Power Indices | |
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| Three Paradoxes of Voting Power | |
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| Empirical Applications of the Power Indices | |
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| Summary and Conclusion | |
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| Coalition Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Power and Coalitions | |
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| Restrictions on Coalition Alignments | |
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| The Stability of Alignments | |
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| Empirical Conclusions of the Luce-Rogow Model | |
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| The Concept of Winning | |
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| The Size Principle | |
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| The Information Effect | |
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| Empirical Evidence for the Size Principle | |
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| Criticisms of the Size Principle | |
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| An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Share of Spoils | |
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| Summary and Conclusion | |
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| Election Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Need for Models to Assess the Consequences of Electoral Reform | |
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| Presidential Campaigns and Voting Behavior | |
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| The Goals of Candidates | |
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| The Popular-Vote Model | |
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| The Electoral-Vote Model | |
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| The 3/2's Allocation Rule | |
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| Why the Large States Are Favored | |
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| Testing the Models | |
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| Campaign Allocations and Biases through 1980 | |
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| Limitations and Extensions of the Models | |
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| Summary and Conclusion | |
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| Glossary | |
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| Annotated Bibliography | |
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| Index | |