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| Notes on Contributors | |
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| Preface to the Second Edition | |
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| Preface to the First Edition | |
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| Should Knowledge Come First? | |
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| Knowledge First | |
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| What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? | |
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| Experience First | |
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| Knowledge Still First | |
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| Still Nowhere Else to Start | |
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| Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? | |
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| The Case against Closure | |
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| The Case for Closure | |
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| Reply to Hawthorne | |
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| Is Knowledge Contextual? | |
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| Contextualism Contested | |
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| Contextualism Defended | |
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| Contextualism Contested Some More | |
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| Contextualism Defended Some More | |
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| Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know? | |
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| Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know | |
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| Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know | |
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| Can Skepticism Be Refuted? | |
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| The Refutation of Skepticism | |
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| The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism | |
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| Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? | |
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| Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated | |
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| Knowledge and the Motive for Truth | |
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| Reply to Zagzebski | |
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| Reply to Baehr | |
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| Can Knowledge Be Lucky? | |
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| Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky | |
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| Knowledge Can Be Lucky | |
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| Is There a Priori Knowledge? | |
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| In Defense of the a Priori | |
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| There Is No a Priori | |
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| Reply to Devitt | |
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| Reply to BonJour | |
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| Last Rejoinder | |
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| Is There Immediate Justification? | |
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| There Is Immediate Justification | |
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| There Is No Immediate Justification | |
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| Reply to Comesa�a | |
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| Reply to Pryor | |
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| Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? | |
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| Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability Catherine Z. Elgin | |
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| Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism | |
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| Reply to Van Cleve | |
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| Reply to Elgin | |
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| Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? | |
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| Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem | |
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| Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem | |
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| Reply to Ginet | |
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| Reply to Klein | |
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| Can Evidence Be Permissive? | |
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| Evidence Can Be Permissive | |
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| Evidence Cannot Be Permissive | |
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| Is Justification Internal? | |
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| Justification Is Not Internal | |
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| Justification Is Internal | |
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| Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? | |
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| Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal | |
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| Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis | |
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| Index | |