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| Preface | |
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| Introduction: What is Analytic Philosophy? | |
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| Leading Analytic Philosophers | |
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| Russell and Moore | |
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| Empiricism, Mathematics, and Symbolic Logic | |
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| Logicism | |
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| Russell on Definite Descriptions | |
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| G. E. Moore's Philosophy of Common Sense | |
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| Moore and Russell on Sense Data | |
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| Moore's and Russell's Anti-Hegelianism | |
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| Summary | |
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| Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Logical Positivism | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | |
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| Historical Note: The Vienna Circle and their Allies | |
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| The Elimination of Metaphysics and the Logical Positivist Program | |
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| The Demise of the Vienna Circle | |
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| The Influence of the Logical Positivists | |
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| Responses to Logical Positivism: Quine, Kuhn, and American Pragmatism | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Demise of the Verifiability Criterion of Meaningfulness | |
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| Quine's Rejection of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction | |
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| Quinean Empiricism without the Dogmas | |
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| American Pragmatists after Quine: Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam | |
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| Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy and Later Wittgenstein | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Attack on Formalism - Strawson and Ryle | |
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| Philosophy of Language - Austin and Wittgenstein | |
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| Philosophy of Mind - Ryle, Strawson, and Wittgenstein | |
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| The Rejection of Sense Data Theory | |
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| The Legacy of Ordinary Language Philosophy | |
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| Responses to Ordinary Language Philosophy: Logic, Language, and Mind | |
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| Part 1: Formal Logic and Philosophy of Language | |
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| G�del and Tarski | |
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| Davidson | |
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| Grice | |
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| Carnap - Meaning and Necessity | |
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| Chomsky | |
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| Part 2: Philosophy of Mind | |
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| Functionalism | |
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| Objections to Functionalism - Bats and the Chinese Room | |
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| Anomalous Monism | |
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| The Problem of Mental Causation | |
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| The Rebirth of Metaphysics | |
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| Modal Logic | |
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| Possible Worlds | |
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| Problems with the Canonical Conception of Possible Worlds | |
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| Transworld Identity and Identification | |
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| The Modal Version of the Ontological Argument | |
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| Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds: Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Traditional Theory of Meaning and Reference | |
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| Kripke's and Donnellan's Criticism of the Traditional Theory: Names and Descriptions | |
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| Natural Kind Terms | |
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| Problems for the New Theory of Reference | |
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| Applications of the New Theory of Reference to the Philosophy of Mind | |
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| The Social, Cultural, and Institutional Basis of Meaning and Reference | |
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| Ethics and Metaethics in the Analytic Tradition | |
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| Introduction | |
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| G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica | |
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| The Non-Cognitivism of C. L. Stevenson | |
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| The Universal Prescriptivism of R. M. Hare | |
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| The Return to Substantive Ethics | |
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| Questioning the Fact/Value Divide | |
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| Peter Singer and Animal Liberation | |
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| John Rawls' Theory of Justice | |
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| Epilogue: Analytic Philosophy Today and Tomorrow | |
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| Analytic Philosophy since 1980 | |
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| What is the Future of Analytic Philosophy? | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |