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| Acknowledgements | |
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| Abbreviations | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Overview: Quine's naturalism | |
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| Fundamentals | |
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| Stimulations and science | |
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| Realism, instrumentalism, pragmatism | |
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| �Our theory� | |
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| Tasks for philosophy | |
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| Quine's philosophical background: beginnings; logic; Carnap | |
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| Early forays, logic, logicism | |
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| Carnap: the Aufbau project and its failure | |
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| Disposing of metaphysics: language-relativity, tolerance, and conventionalism | |
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| The analytic-synthetic distinction | |
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| The analytic-synthetic distinction | |
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| Doubts about meanings | |
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| Artificial languages | |
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| Ouinean analyticity and the issue of scope | |
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| An epistemological distinction? | |
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| The putatively a priori | |
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| Reconceiving epistemology | |
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| Input; observations, evidence, and stimulations | |
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| The genetic project | |
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| Clarification of the genetic project | |
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| Language, meaning, and behavior | |
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| Methods of the project: dispositions | |
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| Approaches to language: working backwards | |
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| The beginnings of cognitive language: shared; responses to stimulation and observation sentences | |
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| Responses to stimulation; perceptual similarity | |
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| Sharing our responses | |
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| Learning | |
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| Observation sentences | |
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| The Janus-faced character of observation sentences: evidence, reference | |
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| Beyond the observation sentences | |
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| Extending the project: learning, evidence, and holism | |
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| Language-dependent learning; more on holism | |
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| Reference | |
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| Reference and identity | |
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| Theory and evidence | |
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| Evidence; observation categorical | |
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| Observation categoricals and empirical content | |
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| Underdetermination | |
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| Radical translation and its indeterminacy | |
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| Indeterminacy of translation | |
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| Indeterminacy of reference | |
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| The threat of incoherence | |
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| Arguing for indeterminacy | |
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| Arguing against indeterminacy | |
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| The significance of indeterminacy | |
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| Quinean metaphysics: limning the structure of reality | |
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| Theory, language, and reality | |
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| Regimentation | |
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| Ontological reduction: definition, explication, and elimination | |
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| A framework for theory: the role of logic | |
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| The syntax of logic; ontological commitment | |
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| Bivalence | |
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| First-order logic | |
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| The bearers of truth-values: eternal sentences | |
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| Truth | |
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| Extensionality, reference, and singular terms | |
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| Singular terms | |
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| Extensionality | |
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| Extensionality and reference | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Ontology, physicalism, realism | |
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| Ontology: general principles; bodies and objects | |
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| Sets, hyper-Pythagoreanism and the role of ontology | |
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| Physicalism | |
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| Realism | |
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| Minds, beliefs, and modality | |
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| The mind and the attitudes | |
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| The de dicto attitudes: syntax and ontology | |
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| The de dicto attitudes: semantics | |
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| Attitudes and facts | |
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| The de re attitudes: a blind alley | |
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| Modality | |
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| Causality, counterfactuals, and natural necessity | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Notes | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Index | |