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| Preface | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Noncooperative Game Theory | |
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| Contract and Cooperative Game Theory | |
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| The Meaning of "Game" | |
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| Representing Games | |
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| The Extensive Form | |
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| Other Examples and Conventions | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Strategies | |
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| Exercises | |
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| The Normal Form | |
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| Classic Normal-Form Games | |
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| Interpretation of the Normal Form | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Utility | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings | |
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| Dominance and Best Response | |
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| Dominance | |
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| The First Strategic Tension and the Prisoners' Dilemma | |
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| The Concept of Efficiency | |
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| Best Response | |
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| Dominance and Best Response Compared | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance | |
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| The Second Strategic Tension | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Location and Partnership | |
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| A Location Game | |
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| A Partnership Game: Strategic Complementarities | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Congruous Strategies and Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Congruous Sets | |
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| Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Equilibrium of the Partnership Game | |
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| Coordination and Social Welfare | |
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| The Third Strategic Tension | |
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| Aside: Behavioral Game Theory | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Oligopoly, Tariffs, and Crime and Punishment | |
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| Cournot Duopoly Model | |
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| Bertrand Duopoly Model | |
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| Tariff Setting by Two Countries | |
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| A Model of Crime and Police | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings | |
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| Complete Contracting in Discretionary Environments | |
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| Contracting with Court-Imposed Breach Remedies | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings | |
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| Details of the Extensive Form | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection | |
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| Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction | |
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| Subgame Perfection | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Topics in Industrial Organization | |
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| Advertising and Competition | |
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| A Model of Limit Capacity | |
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| Dynamic Monopoly | |
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| Price Guarantees as a Commitment to High Prices | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Parlor Games | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Bargaining Problems | |
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| Bargaining: Value Creation and Division | |
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| An Abstract Representation of Bargaining Problems | |
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| An Example | |
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| The Standard Bargaining Solution | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games | |
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| Ultimatum Games: Power to the Proposer | |
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| Two-Period, Alternating-Offer Games: Power to the Patient | |
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| Infinite-Period, Alternating-Offer Game | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium | |
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| Joint Decisions | |
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| Negotiation Equilibrium | |
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| Example: Contracting for High-Powered Incentives | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Investment, Hold Up, and Ownership | |
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| Hold Up Example | |
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| Asset Ownership | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Repeated Games and Reputation | |
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| A Two-Period Repeated Game | |
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| An Infinitely Repeated Game | |
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| The Equilibrium Payoff Set with Low Discounting | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill | |
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| Dynamic Oligopoly and Collusion | |
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| Enforcing International Trade Agreements | |
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| Goodwill and Trading a Reputation | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Information | |
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| Random Events and Incomplete Information | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Risk and Incentives in Contracting | |
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| Risk Aversion | |
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| A Principal-Agent Game | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Trade with Incomplete Information | |
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| Markets and Lemons | |
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| Auctions | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Conditional Beliefs about Types | |
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| Sequential Rationality | |
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| Consistency of Beliefs | |
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| Equilibrium Definition | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Job-Market Signaling and Reputation | |
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| Jobs and School | |
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| Reputation and Incomplete Information | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Appendices | |
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| Review of Mathematics | |
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| Sets | |
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| Functions and Calculus | |
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| Probability | |
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| The Mathematics of Rationalizability | |
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| Dominance, Best Response, and Correlated Conjectures | |
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| Rationalizability Construction | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Index | |