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| Foreword | |
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| Preface | |
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| Introduction: The Making of The 9/11 Commission Report | |
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| The Politics of the 9/11 Era | |
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| The Creation of the 9/11 Commission | |
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| Battles between the Commission and the Administration | |
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| The Public Hearings of the Commission | |
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| The Commission Report | |
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| Shortcomings of the Report | |
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| What's Missing? | |
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| Cast of Characters | |
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| Glossary of Acronyms | |
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| Document: The 9/11 Commission Report | |
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| Preface | |
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| "We Have Some Planes" | |
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| Inside the Four Flights | |
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| Boston: American 11 and United 175 | |
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| Washington Dulles: American 77 | |
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| Newark: United 93 | |
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| The Hijacking of American 11 | |
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| The Hijacking of United 175 | |
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| The Hijacking of American 77 | |
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| The Battle for United 93 | |
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| Improvising a Homeland Defense | |
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| National Crisis Management | |
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| The President and the Vice President | |
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| United 93 and the Shootdown Order | |
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| The Foundation of the New Terrorism | |
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| A Declaration of War | |
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| Bin Ladin's Appeal in the Islamic World | |
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| Islam | |
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| Bin Ladin's Worldview | |
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| History and Political Context | |
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| Social and Economic Malaise | |
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| Bin Ladin's Historical Opportunity | |
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| The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988-1992) | |
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| Attacks Known and Suspected | |
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| Al Qaeda's Renewal in Afghanistan (1996-1998) | |
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| The Embassy Bombings | |
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| Counterterrotism Evolves | |
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| From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing | |
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| Adaptation-and Nonadaptation-in the Law Enforcement Community | |
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| The Justice Department and the FBI | |
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| Legal Constraints on the FBI and "the Wall" | |
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| Other Law Enforcement Agencies | |
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| ...and in the Intelligence Community | |
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| The CIA | |
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| Clandestine and Covert Action | |
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| Analysis | |
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| Early Counterterrorism Efforts | |
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| ...and in the State Department and the Defense Department | |
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| The State Department | |
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| The Department of Defense | |
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| ...and in the White House | |
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| ...and in the Congress | |
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| Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults | |
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| Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania | |
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| Early Efforts against Bin Ladin | |
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| The CIA Develops a Capture Plan | |
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| Crisis: August 1998 | |
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| A Follow-on Campaign? | |
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| Covert Action | |
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| Searching for Fresh Options | |
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| "Boots on the Ground?" | |
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| The Desert Camp, February 1999 | |
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| Looking for New Partners | |
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| Kandahar, May 1999 | |
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| Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland | |
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| Terrorist Entrepreneurs | |
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| Khalid Sheikh Mohammed [KSM] | |
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| The "Planes Operation" | |
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| The Plan Evolves | |
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| The Hamburg Contingent | |
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| Mohamed Atta | |
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| Ramzi Binalshibh | |
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| Marwan al Shehhi | |
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| Ziad Jarrah | |
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| Requirements for a Successful Attack | |
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| From Threat to Threat | |
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| The Millennium Crisis | |
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| "Bodies Will Pile Up in Sacks" | |
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| Ressam's Arrest | |
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| Emergency Cooperation | |
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| A Lost Trail in Southeast Asia | |
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| Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 | |
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| "Afghan Eyes" | |
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| The Attack on the USS Cole | |
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| Considering a Response | |
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| Change and Continuity | |
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| Early Decisions | |
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| Starting a Review | |
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| The New Administration's Approach | |
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| September 2001 | |
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| The Attack Looms | |
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| First Arrivals in California | |
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| The 9/11 Pilots in the United States | |
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| The Fourth Pilot: Hani Hanjour | |
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| Assembling the Teams | |
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| Dissent within the al Qaeda Leadership | |
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| Moving to Departure Positions | |
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| "The System Was Blinking Red" | |
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| The Summer of Threat | |
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| Zacarias Moussaoui | |
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| Time Runs Out | |
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| Heroism and Horror | |
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| Emergency Response at the Pentagon | |
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| Wartime | |
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| Immediate Responses at Home | |
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| Planning for War | |
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| "Phase Two" and the Question of Iraq | |
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| Foresight-and Hindsight | |
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| Imagination | |
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| Historical Perspective | |
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| Understanding the Danger | |
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| Institutionalizing Imagination: The Case of Aircraft as Weapons | |
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| Policy | |
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| Capabilities | |
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| Management | |
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| Operational Management | |
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| Institutional Management | |
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| The Millennium Exception | |
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| What to Do? A Global Strategy | |
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| How to Do It? A Different Way of Organizing Government | |
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| Related Documents | |
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| Declarations by Usama Bin Ladin, August 23, 1996; May 10, 1997; February 23, 1998 | |
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| From The President's Daily Brief, December 4, 1998, and August 6, 2001 | |
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| The 9/11 Commission, Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, December 5, 2005 | |
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| Appendixes | |
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| A 9/11 Chronology (1978-2005) | |
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| Questions for Consideration | |
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| Selected Bibliography | |
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| Index | |