Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile

Name: Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile
Price: 38.57 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780271035635

ISBN-10: 0271035633

ISBN-13: 9780271035635

Edition: 2009

Authors: Marcelo Bergman

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Description:

Few tasks are as crucial for the future of democracy in Latin America-and, indeed, in other underdeveloped areas of the world-as strengthening the rule of law and reforming the system of taxation. In this book, Marcelo Bergman shows how success in getting citizens to pay their taxes is related intimately to the social norms that undergird the rule of law. The threat of legal sanctions is itself insufficient to motivate compliance, he argues. That kind of deterrence works best when citizens already have other reasons to want to comply, based on their beliefs about what is fair and about how their fellow citizens are behaving. The problem of "free riding," which arises when cheaters can count…

Book details

Copyright year: 2009
Publisher: Pennsylvania State University Press
Publication date: 4/15/2013
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 280
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.78" tall
Weight: 0.946
Language: English

Marcelo Bergman is Associate Professor in the Department of Legal Studies at CIDE in Mexico City and the director of PESED (Program for the Study of Security and the Rule of Law). He has served as a consultant to tax administrations in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.



List of Figures and Tables


Preface and Acknowledgments


Introduction



Compliance and Enforcement



Measuring Tax Compliance in Chile and Argentina



Taxpayers' Perceptions of Government Enforcement



General Deterrence: Impunity and Sanctions in Taxation



Specific Deterrence and Its Effects on Individual Compliance



The Role of Trust, Reciprocity, and Solidarity in Tax Compliance



Social Mechanisms in Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance


Conclusion: Tax Compliance and the Law



On the Data



A Game Theory Approach to the Logic of Tax Compliance



A Simulative Game: The Effects of Enforcement



The State, the Law, and the Rule of Law


References


Index