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| Preface | |
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| Ideas of the Founding Fathers: Oligopoly Theory and Modern Game Theory | |
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| Game Theory Tools | |
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| Games in Normal Form and Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Supermodular Games and Lattice Programming | |
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| Lattices and Tarski's Theorem | |
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| Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Lattice Programming, and Complementarity | |
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| Supermodular Games | |
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| Existence Results for Quasi-increasing and Decreasing Best Replies | |
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| Quasi-increasing Best Replies in Symmetric Games | |
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| Decreasing Best Replies in n-Player Games | |
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| Mixed Strategies | |
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| Uniqueness | |
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| Stability | |
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| Dominance Solvability and Rationalizability | |
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| Tatonnement Stability | |
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| Incomplete Information and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Lattice Programming under Uncertainty | |
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| Information Structures and Signals | |
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| Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Foundations of Partial Equilibrium Analysis | |
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| A Canonical Partial Equilibrium Model | |
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| Small Expenditure Shares and Small Income Effects | |
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| Consumer Surplus Analysis | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Quantity Competition: The Cournot Model | |
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| The Model and Existence of Equilibrium | |
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| Characterization of Smooth Cournot Games | |
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| Comparative Statics and Entry | |
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| Comparative Statics | |
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| Entry | |
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| Large Markets | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Price Competition: The Models of Bertrand and Edgeworth | |
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| Bertrand Competition | |
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| Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition | |
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| Rationing Rules and Contingent Demand | |
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| Equilibria: The Existence Problem | |
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| Mixed Strategies | |
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| Price Competition and the Cournot Model | |
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| Large Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets | |
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| Concluding Remark: The Rationale for Mixed Strategies | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Product Differentiation | |
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| Demand Systems | |
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| Quantity and Price Competition | |
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| Characterization and Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria | |
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| Large Markets and Monopolistic Competition | |
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| Bertand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition | |
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| Monopolistic Competition and Entry | |
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| Product Selection and Complementary Products | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Conjectures, Reactions, and Commitment | |
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| Conjectural Variations | |
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| Supply Functions | |
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| Capacity Determining Competitive Supply | |
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| Choice of Strategy Space | |
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| Discussion | |
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| Collusion and Facilitating Practices | |
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| Commitment and Pricing | |
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| The Stackelberg Model | |
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| Entry Deterrence, Limit Pricing, and Incumbency Advantages | |
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| A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Competition with Asymmetric Information | |
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| Static Competition with Incomplete Information | |
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| Existence of Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| The Linear-Normal Model | |
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| Monopolistic Competition with Private Information | |
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| Information Sharing | |
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| Information Exchange in Oligopoly | |
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| Monopolistic Competition: Trade Associations and Disclosure Rules | |
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| Welfare Analysis | |
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| Strategic Information Transmission | |
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| Information Exchange, Collusion, and Mechanism Design | |
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| Mechanism Design and Collusion | |
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| Collusion in a Cournot Market | |
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| Collusion in a Large Market | |
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| Information Sharing in Large Markets | |
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| Commitment under Uncertainty and Information Manipulation | |
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| Uncertainty, Flexibility, and Commitment | |
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| Observability, Commitment, and Private Information | |
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| Limit Pricing and Signaling Distortions | |
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| Price Setting and Information Manipulation | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Repeated Interaction and Dynamics | |
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| Repeated Interaction and Collusion | |
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| Finite Horizon | |
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| Infinite Horizon | |
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| Uncertainty and Imperfect Monitoring | |
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| Collusive Pricing and Fluctuations | |
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| Private Information, Communication, and Collusion | |
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| Discussion | |
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| Dynamic Pricing and Commitment | |
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| Alternating Move Duopoly Games | |
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| A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior with Adjustment Costs | |
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| Commitment and Pricing in Continuous Time | |
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| Summary | |
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| Exercises | |
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| Epilogue | |
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| Notes | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |