Transition and Economics Politics, Markets, and Firms

ISBN-10: 026268148X

ISBN-13: 9780262681483

Edition: 2004

List price: $34.00
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Description:

The transition from socialism to capitalism in former socialist economies has transformed the economic structure. This book provides an overview of research on the issues raised by the shift from collective to private ownership.
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Book details

List price: $34.00
Copyright year: 2004
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 1/30/2004
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 430
Size: 7.25" wide x 8.50" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.540
Language: English

Acknowledgments
Introduction: Transition and Economics
Understanding Transition
Little Prior Knowledge Before Transition
Surprises of Transition
The Initial Situation before Transition
Objectives and Constraints of Transition
Stylized Facts about Transition
Differences in Reform Paths and Strategies
Differences in Macroeconomic Performance after Liberalization
Differences in Enterprise Performance in Response to Changes in Ownership and Corporate Governance
Summary
Political Constraints and Reform Strategy
The Politics of Reforms under Uncertainty
The Importance of Political Constraints
Ex Ante and Ex Post Political Constraints
Gradualism and the Interim Status Quo Bias
Aggregate Uncertainty
The Trade-offs between Big Bang and Gradualism
The Role of Complementarities and Reform Momentum
The Role of Reversal Costs
Optimal Sequencing
Sequencing of Reforms with Differences in Expected Outcome
Sequencing of Reforms with Differences in Riskiness
Sequencing of Reforms with Differences in Constituencies
The Possible Trade-off between Ex Ante Acceptability and Ex Post Irreversibility
Exogenous versus Endogenous "Reelection" or Future Support and Related Literature
Sequencing of Reforms in Transition Economies
Other Applications of Reform Sequencing: European Integration
Speed of Reform and Endogenous Investment
China: The M-Form versus U-Form Organization
Political Constraints without Uncertainty
Efficiency and Compensation of Losers from Reform
No Transfers and Majority Voting
Divide-and-Rule Tactics
Packaging Reforms to Gain Majority Support
Transfers and Asymmetric Information
Secession and Transfers
Other Models on Political Constraints and the Speed of Transition
Some Empirical Literature on Political Constraints
Alternative Approaches to the Political Economy of Reform
The Political Economy of Mass Privatization
Modeling a Possible Privatization Reversal
Privatization Reversal
Multiple Equilibria and Critical Mass in Privatization
The Political Effect of Giveaway Privatization
Giveaway to the Population or to Insiders
Thatcherian Underpricing
Empirical Evidence
The Economic Costs of Mass Privatization Programs
Conclusions for Part One
Allocative Changes
The Optimal Speed of Sectoral Reallocation
Labor Market Frictions
The Aghion-Blanchard Model
Endogenous Capital Accumulation
The Optimal Speed of Transition
Deviations from the Optimal Speed
Related Theoretical Literature
The Empirical Literature on Sectoral and Labor Reallocation
How Relevant Was the Optimal Speed Debate?
Speed and Methods of Price Liberalization
Pitfalls of Partial Liberalization
Dual-Track Price Liberalization
Efficient Supply and Rationing
Inefficient Supply and Rationing
The Plan Quantity Greater Than the Market Quantity
Efficiency and Pareto Improvement under the Dual Track
Enforcement of the Dual Track
The Dual Track and Corruption
The Dual Track beyond Transition
Evidence on the Resistance to Price Liberalization
Evidence on the Allocative Effects of Dual-Track Liberalization
Conclusion
Liberalization and the Output Fall
The Output Fall in Central and Eastern Europe
Explanations for the Output Fall
Disruption and Bargaining Inefficiency
Search Frictions and Specific Investment
The Initial Situation under Socialism
Conditions for an "All-Search" Equilibrium
Output Dynamics
Output Dynamics under Dual-Track Liberalization
Related literature
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Government Collapse and Economic Performance
Introduction
Government Collapse or Law Enforcement
Mafia and Government Protection
Crime and Punishment ... and Taxes
Law Enforcement and Dualism
The EU Accession Effect
The Empirical Literature
The Unofficial Economy
Corruption
Private Contracting under Weak Law Enforcement
Conclusion for Part Two
Governance Changes
Solving the Incentive Problems Inherited from Socialism
Government Intervention in Firms
Government Control over Firms
Privatization
Trade-offs in Public and Private Provision of Public Goods
Control Rights and Information
The Ratchet Effect
The Ratchet Effect under Socialism
The Ratchet Effect and the Managerial Labor Market
The Soft Budget Constraint
The Basic Model of Soft Budget Constraints
The Soft Budget Constraint and the Ratchet Effect
The Lack of Innovation under Socialism
Soft Budget Constraints and Shortage
Soft Budget Constraints and Enterprise Autonomy
Hardening Budget Constraints and Privatization
Hardening Budget Constraints through Demonopolization
Some Empirical Literature
Comparing Policies of Privatization and Restructuring
The Different Approaches to Privatization
The Objectives of Privatization
The Constraints Facing Privatization Policies
Summarizing the Objectives and Constraints
Evaluating Different Privatization Policies
Models of Privatization
The Vested Interests of Insider Privatization
Better Incentives versus Softer Budget Constraints and Asset Stripping
Privatization with Noncash Bids and Ex Post Moral Hazard
Empirical Evidence
Incentives within Government Bureaucracy
Federalism and the Hardening of Budget Constraints
Soft Budget Constraints under Centralized Government
The Hardening Effect of Fiscal Decentralization
Partial Decentralization: Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Comparative Statics: SOEs versus TVEs
Empirical Evidence and Applications
Federalism and Yardstick Competition
Chinese Federalism versus Russia
Understanding Township and Village Enterprises
The Soft Budget Constraint and Financial Transition
Dealing with Soft Budget Constraints of Firms
Decentralized Banking
Trade Arrears and Restructuring with Redeployment
Entry
Changes in Screening Technology
Dealing with Soft Budget Constraints of Banks
Bank Passivity and Gambling for Resurrection
Rent Seeking by Banks
Incentives to Reveal Bad Debts
The Empirical Literature
Conclusion to Part Three
Synthesizing Lessons from Transition
What Have We Learned about Transition?
The Washington Consensus versus the Evolutionary-Institutionalist Perspective
A Broad Assessment
What Has Economics Learned from Transition?
References
Author Index
Subject Index
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