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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Static Games of Complete Information | |
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| Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominance | |
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| Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium | |
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| Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability | |
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| Correlated Equilibrium | |
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| Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria | |
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| Dynamic Games of Complete Information | |
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| Extensive-Form Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions | |
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| The Extensive Form | |
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| Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games | |
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| Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection | |
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| Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection | |
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| A First Look at Repeated Games | |
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| The Rubenstein-Stahl Bargaining Model | |
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| Simple Timing Games | |
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| Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubenstein Bargaining Game | |
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| Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria | |
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| Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Repeated Games | |
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| Repeated Games with Observable Actions | |
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| Finitely Repeated Games | |
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| Repeated Games with Varying Opponents | |
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| Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in Repeated Games | |
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| Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information | |
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| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information | |
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| Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Static Games of Incomplete Information | |
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| Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Incomplete Information | |
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| Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information | |
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| The Notions of Type and Strategy | |
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| Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies | |
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| Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria | |
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| The Distributional Approach | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Bayesian Games and Mechanical Design | |
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| Examples of Mechanical Design | |
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| Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle | |
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| Mechanism Design with a Single Agent | |
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| Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiency | |
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| Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization | |
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| Further Topics in Mechanism Design | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information | |
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| Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information | |
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| Extensive-Form Refinements | |
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| Strategic-Form Refinements | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Reputation Effects | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Games with a Single Long-Run Player | |
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| Games with a Many Long-Run Players | |
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| A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long-Lived Opponents | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model | |
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| Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or Repeated-Sale Model | |
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| Price Offers by and Informed Buyer | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Advanced Topics | |
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| More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance | |
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| Strategic Stability | |
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| Signaling Games | |
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| Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money" | |
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| Robust Predictions under Payoffs Uncertainty | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games | |
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| Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria | |
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| Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs | |
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| Supermodular Games | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium | |
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| Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games | |
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| Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition and Properties | |
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| Differential Games | |
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| Capital-Accumulation Games | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Common Knowledge and Games | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Knowledge and Common Knowledge | |
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| Common Knowledge and Equilibrium | |
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| Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |