Game Theory

ISBN-10: 0262061414
ISBN-13: 9780262061414
Edition: 1991
List price: $105.00 Buy it from $34.73
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Description: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will  More...

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Book details

List price: $105.00
Copyright year: 1991
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 8/29/1991
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 608
Size: 7.50" wide x 10.50" long x 1.50" tall
Weight: 3.146
Language: English

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics at MIT.

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

Acknowledgments
Introduction
Static Games of Complete Information
Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominance
Nash Equilibrium
Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
Exercises
References
Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium
Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
Correlated Equilibrium
Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
Dynamic Games of Complete Information
Extensive-Form Games
Introduction
Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
The Extensive Form
Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
Exercises
References
Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
Introduction
The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection
A First Look at Repeated Games
The Rubenstein-Stahl Bargaining Model
Simple Timing Games
Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubenstein Bargaining Game
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria
Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria
Exercises
References
Repeated Games
Repeated Games with Observable Actions
Finitely Repeated Games
Repeated Games with Varying Opponents
Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in Repeated Games
Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period
Exercises
References
Static Games of Incomplete Information
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
Incomplete Information
Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information
The Notions of Type and Strategy
Bayesian Equilibrium
Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibrium
Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
The Distributional Approach
Exercises
References
Bayesian Games and Mechanical Design
Examples of Mechanical Design
Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle
Mechanism Design with a Single Agent
Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiency
Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
Further Topics in Mechanism Design
Appendix
Exercises
References
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection
Introduction
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information
Extensive-Form Refinements
Strategic-Form Refinements
Appendix
Exercises
References
Reputation Effects
Introduction
Games with a Single Long-Run Player
Games with a Many Long-Run Players
A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long-Lived Opponents
Exercises
References
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
Introduction
Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model
Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or Repeated-Sale Model
Price Offers by and Informed Buyer
Exercises
References
Advanced Topics
More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
Strategic Stability
Signaling Games
Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money"
Robust Predictions under Payoffs Uncertainty
Exercises
References
Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs
Supermodular Games
Exercises
References
Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games
Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition and Properties
Differential Games
Capital-Accumulation Games
Exercises
References
Common Knowledge and Games
Introduction
Knowledge and Common Knowledge
Common Knowledge and Equilibrium
Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure
Exercises
References
Index

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