Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

ISBN-10: 0226567702
ISBN-13: 9780226567709
Edition: 2005
List price: $17.00 Buy it from $3.00
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Description: Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl—a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq—considers the now-crucial question  More...

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Book details

List price: $17.00
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication date: 9/15/2005
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 280
Size: 6.00" wide x 8.75" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.254
Language: English

Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl—a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq—considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl—the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass—argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. With a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.

John A. Nagl is a retired lieutenant colonel of the U.S. Army. A graduate of West Point and a Rhodes Scholar, he received his Ph.D. from St. Antony's College, Oxford, where he wrote his thesis on counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. Nagl served as the military assistant to deputy secretaries of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Gordon England, where he coauthored the U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual with generals David Petraeus and James M. Mattis. He is the former president of the Center for a New American Security and the ninth headmaster of the Haverford School in Pennsylvania.

Illustrations Foreword
Preface to the Paperback Edition
Acknowledgments
Introduction
List of Abbreviations
Setting the Stage
How Armies Learn
The Hard Lesson of Insurgency
The British and American Armies: Separated by a Common Language
Malaya
British Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1951
The Empire Strikes Back: British Army Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1952-1957
Vietnam
The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and Learning During the Advisory Years, 1950-1964
The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and Learning During the Fighting Years, 1965-1972
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Hard Lessons: The British and American Armies Learn Counterinsurgency
Organizational Culture and Learning Institutions: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Selected
Bibliography
Index

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