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| Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach | |
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| Deliberation | |
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| Phronesis | |
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| The Phronesis Controversy | |
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| Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action | |
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| Right Action for Virtue Ethics | |
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| Right Action and Serious Practical Concerns | |
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| Two Constraints on Right Action | |
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| Must Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint? | |
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| Can Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint? | |
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| Right Action and Virtuous Motives | |
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| The Structure of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics | |
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| Virtuous Acts and Virtuous Motivations | |
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| Why Virtues are Virtues | |
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| Reasons for Virtue | |
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| Right Action and 'The Virtuous Person' | |
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| Doing Without 'The Virtuous Person' | |
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| 'Virtuous Enough' | |
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| Ideals and Aspirations | |
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| Virtues, Persons, and 'The Virtuous Person' | |
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| Representing 'The Virtuous Person' | |
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| The Enumeration Problem | |
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| The Enumeration Problem | |
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| The Enumeration Problem: An Introduction | |
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| Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Actions | |
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| Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Persons | |
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| Enumeration and Naturalism | |
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| Individuating the Virtues | |
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| From Individuation to Enumeration | |
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| 'The Same Reasons' | |
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| Reasons, Individuation, and Cardinality | |
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| Implications for Hard Virtue Ethics | |
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| Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination | |
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| Magnificence as a Virtue | |
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| Subordination, Specialization, and Cardinality | |
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| Alternatives to the Subordination View | |
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| Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues | |
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| Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions | |
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| Situationism and Dispositionism | |
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| Situationism and Personality | |
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| Idiographic Predictions of Consistency | |
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| Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence | |
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| How to Test Broad-Based Dispositions for Cross-Situational Consistency | |
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| Putting Dispositions to the Test: Four Representative Experiments | |
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| Interpreting the Findings | |
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| From Situationism to Virtue Theory 292 | |
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| Situationism: From Empirical to Philosophical Psychology | |
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| Situationism and Virtue Theory: Normative Adequacy | |
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| From Common Sense to Virtue Theory? | |
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| Out-Sourcing the Empirical Work? | |
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| A Cognitive-Affective Approach to the Virtues | |
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| Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues | |
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| The Unity of Which Virtues? | |
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| What Unifies the Virtues? | |
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| Attributive and Model Theses | |
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| Responsibility for Character | |
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| Depth, Self-Construction, and Responsibility | |
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| On Responsibility and 'Ultimate Responsibility' for Character | |
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| What is Critical Distance? | |
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| From Critical Distance to Responsibility | |
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| Objections to the Critical Distance View | |
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| Works Cited | |
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| Index Locorum | |
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| General Index | |