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Preface to the Revised Edition | |
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Preface and Acknowledgements to the First Edition | |
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About the Author | |
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Introduction | |
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Basic questions | |
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Catching a glimpse of the past | |
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Basic formalism | |
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Aggregation of preferences - how can this be done? | |
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The informational aspect | |
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A path through haze, or how to read this book | |
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Some exercises | |
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Arrow's impossibility result | |
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The axiom system and the theorem | |
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The original proof | |
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A second proof | |
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A third diagrammatic proof | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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Majority decision under restricted domains | |
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The simple majority rule | |
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Single-peaked preferences | |
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Other domain conditions: qualitative and quantitative | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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Individual rights | |
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Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal | |
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Gibbard's theory of alienable rights | |
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Conditional and unconditional preferences | |
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Conditional and unconditional preferences again: matching pennies and the prisoners' dilemma | |
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The game form approach to rights | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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Manipulability | |
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The underlying problem | |
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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | |
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Strategy-proofness and restricted domains | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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Escaping impossibilities: social choice rules | |
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The Pareto-extension rule and veto power | |
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Scoring functions and the Borda rule | |
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Other social choice rules | |
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A parliamentary vote: Berlin vs. Bonn | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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Distributive justice: Rawlsian and utilitarian rules | |
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The philosophical background | |
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The informational structure | |
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Axioms and characterizations | |
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Diagrammatic proofs again | |
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Harsanyi's utilitarianism | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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Cooperative bargaining | |
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The bargaining problem | |
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Nash's bargaining solution | |
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Zeuthen's principle of alternating concessions | |
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The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution | |
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A philosopher's view | |
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Kalai's egalitarian solution | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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Empirical social choice | |
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Theory and opinions of the general public | |
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Needs vs. tastes - the approach by Yaari and Bar-Hillel | |
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Rawls's equity axiom - how does it fare? | |
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From here to where? | |
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A short summary | |
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Some exercises | |
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A few steps beyond | |
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Social choice rules in continuous space | |
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The uniform rule | |
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Freedom of choice | |
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An epilogue instead of a summary | |
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References | |
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Hints to the Exercises | |
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Author Index | |
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Subject Index | |