Strategy and Dynamics in Contests

Name: Strategy and Dynamics in Contests
Price: 25.0 USD
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ISBN: 9780199549603

ISBN-10: 0199549605

ISBN-13: 9780199549603

Edition: 2009

Authors: Kai A. Konrad

List price: $49.49

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This book describes the theory structure underlying contests, in which players expend effort and/or spend money in trying to get ahead of one another. Uniquely, this effort is sunk and cannot be recovered, regardless of whether a player wins or loses in the competition. Such interactions include diverse phenomena such as marketing and advertising by firms, litigation, relative reward schemes in firms, political competition, patent races, sports, military combat, war and civil war.These have been studied in the field of contest theory both within these specific contexts and at a higher level of abstraction. The purpose of this book is to describe the fundamental common properties of these…

Book details

List price: $49.49
Copyright year: 2009
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 3/5/2009
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 256
Size: 6.10" wide x 9.21" long x 0.59" tall
Weight: 0.946
Language: English

Kai A. Konrad is Professor of Economics at Free University of Berlin and Director at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).



Preface and Acknowledgements



An Introduction to Contests



A definition



Examples



The structure of the book



Types of Contests



The first-price all-pay auction



Additive noise



The Tullock contest



Experimental evidence



Evolutionary success



Summary



Timing and Participation



Endogenous timing



Voluntary participation



Exclusion



Delegation



Summary



Cost and prize structure



Choice of cost



The structure of prizes



Endogenous prizes



Summary



Externalities



State lotteries and financing public goods



A loser's preference about who wins



Personnel economics and sabotage



Information externalities and campaigning



Inter-group contests and free riding



Conclusions



Nested contests



Exogenous sharing rules



The choice of sharing rules



Intra-group conflict



A strategy of analysis of nested contests



Alliances



The alliance formation puzzle



Solutions to the alliance formation puzzle



Summary



Dynamic battles



The elimination tournament



The race



The tug-of-war



Iterating incumbency fights



Endogenous fighting



Summary: the discouragement effect



Conclusions