Ways a World Might Be Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays

Name: Ways a World Might Be Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays
Price: 191.81 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780199251483

ISBN-10: 0199251487

ISBN-13: 9780199251483

Edition: 2003

Authors: Robert C. Stalnaker

List price: $185.00

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Robert Stalnaker draws together in this volume his seminal work in metaphysics. The central theme is the role of possible worlds in articulating our various metaphysical commitments. The book begins with reflections on the general idea of a possible world, and then uses the framework of possible worlds to formulate and clarify some questions about properties and individuals, reference, thought, and experience. The essays also reflect on the nature of metaphysics, and on the relation between questions about what there is and questions about how we talk and think about what there is. Two of the fourteen essays, plus an extensive introduction that sets the papers in context and draws out the…

Book details

List price: $185.00
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Publication date: 10/9/2003
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 300
Size: 6.14" wide x 9.21" long x 0.81" tall
Weight: 1.298
Language: English

Robert C. Stalnaker is a professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University.



Introduction



Ways and Worlds



Possible Worlds



On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be



Impossibilities



Carving Up Logical Space



Anti-Essentialism



Varieties of Supervenience



Identity In and Across Possible Worlds



Counterparts and Identity



Vague Identity



The Interaction of Modality with Quantifiers and Identity



Semantics, Metasemantics, and Metaphysics



Reference and Necessity



On Considering a Possible World as Actual



Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity



Subjective Possibilities



What is it Like to be a Zombie?



Comparing Qualia Across Persons



On Thomas Nagel's Objective Self