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| Introduction: what are signals? | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Signals and cues | |
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| The problem of reliability | |
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| The forms of signals | |
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| Efficacy | |
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| Evolutionary origin | |
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| Mimicry | |
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| Sensory manipulation | |
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| Action-response games, and some alternatives | |
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| Sexual selection | |
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| Paternal care | |
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| Sexually attractive sons | |
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| 'Good genes'--indices and handicaps | |
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| The female gets nothing (sensory exploitation) | |
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| Definitions and terminology | |
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| The theory of costly signalling | |
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| Introduction | |
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| A brief history of the handicap principle | |
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| The Philip Sidney game | |
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| The discrete model | |
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| A model with continuously varying signallers | |
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| A model with continuously varying signals and responses | |
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| Perceptual error | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| 'Pooling equilibria'--a more radical proposal | |
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| Non-signalling equilibria | |
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| Must honest signals always be costly? | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Strategic signals and minimal-cost signals | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Strategic signals | |
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| Stalk-eyed flies | |
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| Musth in elephants | |
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| Chick begging | |
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| Minimal-cost signals | |
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| When can minimal-cost signals be evolutionarily stable? | |
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| Signals between unrelated individuals with a common interest | |
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| Relatedness | |
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| Kin recognition | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Indices of quality | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Are mammalian sounds reliable indices of size? | |
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| The evolution of indices | |
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| Indices in different contexts | |
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| Indices of condition | |
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| Indices of size and RHP | |
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| Performance indices | |
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| Parasites | |
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| Indices of ownership | |
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| Signals in contests, and in mate choice | |
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| Indices and handicaps | |
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| Some problem cases | |
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| Stotting | |
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| Fluctuating asymmetry | |
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| Displays of weapons | |
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| The evolution of signal form | |
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| Ritualization | |
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| Efficacy | |
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| Arms races, manipulation and sensory bias | |
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| Introduction | |
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| A model, and an experiment | |
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| The response to novel signals | |
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| The comparative data | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Sensory manipulation | |
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| Frogs and swordtails | |
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| Nuptial gifts in insects | |
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| Further examples of sensory manipulation | |
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| Mimicry and cheating | |
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| Signals during contests | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Badges of status | |
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| An avian example | |
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| ESS models of badges | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Can signals of need settle contests? | |
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| The war of attrition | |
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| The war of attrition with random rewards | |
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| A model of conventional signals of need | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Punishment | |
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| Protracted contests and varied signals | |
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| Varied signals--the evidence | |
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| Cichlid fishes and the sequential assessment game | |
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| Spider fights, and a motivational model | |
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| Territorial behaviour and the negotiation game | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Signals in primates and other social animals | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Vervet Monkeys: a case study | |
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| How does the ability to signal develop? | |
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| Questions about what is going on in an animal's head | |
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| Do signals convey information about the external world? | |
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| Do signallers intend to alter the behaviour of receivers? | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Social reputation and the honesty of signals | |
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| Introduction | |
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| A model | |
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| Evidence for direct reputation | |
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| Emotional commitment | |
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| Cultural and innate behaviour | |
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| 'Altruistic punishment' in humans | |
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| Mutual displays | |
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| The interpretation of group displays | |
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| Human language | |
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| Cultural inheritance in Chimpanzees | |
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| The peculiarities of human language | |
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| The evolution of language | |
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| Glossary of scientific names | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |