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Preface for the Instructor | |
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Introducing The Book | |
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Philosophical Questions and Wonder | |
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Features of This Book | |
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A Little Logic | |
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The Philosophy Of Religion | |
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Challenges to Religious Belief | |
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David Hume: The Irrationality of Believing in Miracles | |
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Karl Marx: Religion as the Opium of the Masses | |
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Friedrich Nietzsche: The Death of God | |
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The Problem of Evil | |
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Fyodor Dostoevsky: God and Human Suffering | |
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John | |
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Mackie: The Logical Problem of Evil | |
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William Rowe: The Logical Problem of Evil Challenged | |
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John Hick: A Soul-Making Theodicy | |
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Mysticism and Religious Experience | |
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Hindu Mysticism | |
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William James: The Limited Authority of Mystical Experiences | |
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Bertrand Russell: The Untrustworthiness of Mystical Experiences | |
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Richard Swinburne: The Trustworthiness of Religious Experiences | |
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The Ontological Argument for God''s Existence | |
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Anselm''s Proofs | |
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Gaunilo, Aquinas, and Kant: Against the Ontological Argument | |
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The Cosmological Argument for God''s Existence | |
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Aquinas''s Proofs | |
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Clarke''s Proof and Hume''s Criticisms | |
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The Design Argument for God''s Existence | |
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David Hume: Against the Design Argument | |
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William Paley: The Design Argument Revisited | |
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Charles Darwin: Evolution and the Design Argument | |
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Robin Collins: The Fine-Tuning Argument | |
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Faith and Rationality | |
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Blaise Pascal: Waging on Belief in God | |
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William James: The Will to Believe | |
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Alvin Plantinga and Jay Van Hook: Can We Know God Without Arguments? | |
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Human Nature And The Self | |
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Determinism Versus Free Will | |
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Baron d''Holbach: The Case for Determinism | |
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David Hume: Compatibilism | |
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Thomas Reid: In Defense of Free Will | |
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Richard Taylor: Determinism, Indeterminism, and Agency | |
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Harry Frankfurt: Determinism and Second-Order Desires | |
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Identity and Survival | |
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Buddhism: No-Self and Transmigration of the Soul | |
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David Hume: The Self as a Bundle of Perceptions | |
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Terence Penelhum: Identity and Survival | |
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The Self as Active Being | |
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Soren Kierkegaard: The Self as Spirit | |
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Karl Marx: The Self as Worker | |
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Friedrich Nietzsche: The Self as the Will to Power | |
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Martin Heidegger: The Self as Being Toward Death | |
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The Self Connected with a Larger Reality | |
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Hindu Upanishads: The Self-God | |
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Chuang-tzu: The Way of Nature | |
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Arne Naess: The Ecological Self | |
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Charles Darwin: Human Beings as Evolved Animals | |
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Souls, Minds, Bodies, And Machines | |
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Ancient Western Views on Body, Soul, and Mind | |
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Materialism, Atoms, and Sensation: Democritus and Lucretius | |
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Body and Soul: Plato | |
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Soul as Form of the Body: Aristotle | |
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Classic Hindu Views on Soul, Self, and God | |
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Katha Upanishad: The Outer Empirical Self and the Inner Self-God | |
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Sankara: Strict Monism | |
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Ramanuja: Qualified Monism | |
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Modern Views on Mind and Body | |
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Rene Descartes: Mental and Physical Substance | |
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Anne Conway: The Mixture of Body and Soul | |
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Benedict Spinoza and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Idealist Monism and Parallelism | |
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Twentieth-Century Views on Mind and Body | |
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Gilbert Ryle: Logical Behaviorism | |
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J.J. | |
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Smart and Paul Churchland: Mind-Brain Identity and Eliminative Materialism | |
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Jerry Fodor: Functionalism | |
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Intentionality | |
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Franz Brentano: Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental | |
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Daniel Dennett: Kinds of Intentional Psychology | |
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Minds and Machines | |
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Thomas Huxley: Humans as Machines | |
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Ludwig Wittgenstein and Paul Ziff: Reminders About Machines and Thinking | |
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John Searle: Minds, Brains, and the Chinese Room Argument | |
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William | |
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Lycan: A Reply to Searle | |
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John Haugeland: Natural Languages, AI, and Existential Holism | |
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Epistemology | |
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Skepticism and Certainty | |
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Chuang-tzu: The Relativity of All Things | |
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Sextus Empiricus: The Goals and Methods of Skepticism | |
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Rene Descartes: Dreams, Illusions, and the Evil Genius | |
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David Hume: Skepticism About the External World | |
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David Hume and Peter Strawson: The Problem of Induction | |
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Sources of Knowledge: Rationalism and Empiricism | |
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Plato: Knowledge Does Not Come from the Senses | |
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John Locke: All Knowledge Derives from the Senses | |
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John Searle: The Nature of Perception | |
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A Priori Knowledge | |
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David Hume: The Fo | |