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| Preface | |
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| Introduction: A Few Preliminaries | |
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| Mind | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Descartes: The beginnings of modern philosophy of mind | |
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| The private-language argument | |
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| Computers as models of the mind | |
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| Why should there be a functionalist theory? | |
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| Functionalism: A first problem | |
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| A simple-minded functionalist theory of pain | |
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| Ramsey's solution to the first problem | |
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| Functionalism: A second problem | |
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| M again | |
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| Consciousness | |
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| The puzzle of the physical | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Knowledge | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Plato: Knowledge as justified true belief | |
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| Descartes' way: Justification requires certainty | |
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| Locke's way: Justification can be less than certain | |
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| The foundations of knowledge | |
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| Ways around skepticism I: Verificationism | |
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| Ways around skepticism II: Causal theories of knowledge | |
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| Causal theories contrasted with traditional accounts of justification | |
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| Epistemology naturalized | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Language | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The linguistic turn | |
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| The beetle in the box | |
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| Frege's "sense" and "reference" | |
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| Predicates and open sentences | |
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| Problems of intensionality | |
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| Truth conditions and possible worlds | |
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| Analytic-synthetic and necessary-contingent | |
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| Natural language and logical form | |
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| Using logic: Truth preservation, probability, and the lottery paradox | |
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| Logical truth and logical properties | |
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| Conventions of language | |
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| The paradox of analysis | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Science | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Description and prescription | |
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| An example: Gregor Mendel's genetic theory | |
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| Theory and observation | |
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| The received view of theories | |
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| The deductive-nomological model of explanation | |
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| Theory reduction and instrumentalism | |
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| Theory-ladenness | |
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| Justifying theories I: The problem of induction | |
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| Goodman's new riddle of induction | |
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| Justifying theories II: Popper and falsification | |
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| Justifying theories III: Inference to the best explanation | |
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| Laws and causation | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Morality | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Facts and values | |
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| Realism and emotivism | |
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| Intuitionism | |
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| Emotivism again | |
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| Kant's universalizability principle | |
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| Dealing with relativism | |
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| Prescriptivism and supervenience | |
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| Problems of utilitarianism I: Defining "utility" | |
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| Problems of utilitarianism II: Consequentialism versus absolutism | |
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| Rights | |
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| Self and others | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Politics | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Hobbes: Escaping the state of nature | |
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| Problems for Hobbes | |
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| Game theory I: Two-person zero-sum games | |
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| Game theory II: The prisoners' dilemma | |
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| The limits of prudence | |
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| Rawls's theory of justice | |
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| The difference principle and inequality surpluses | |
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| Criticizing Rawls I: The structure of his argument | |
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| Criticizing Rawls II: Why maximin? | |
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| Criticizing Rawls III: The status of the two principles | |
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| Reflective equilibrium | |
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| Are the two principles right? | |
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| Nozick: Beginning with rights | |
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| The entitlement theory | |
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| Ethics and politics | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Law | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Defining "law" I: Positivism and natural law | |
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| Defining "law" II: Legal systems and the variety of laws | |
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| Hart: The elements of a legal system | |
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| Punishment: The problem | |
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| Justifying punishment: Deterrence | |
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| Retributivism: Kant's objections | |
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| Combining deterrence and retribution | |
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| Deterrence theory again | |
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| Why do definitions matter? | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Metaphysics | |
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| Introduction | |
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| An example: The existence of numbers | |
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| "God" as a proper name | |
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| The necessary being | |
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| Hume: No a priori proofs of matters of fact | |
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| Kant: "Existence" is not a predicate | |
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| A posteriori arguments | |
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| The argument from design | |
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| The harmony of nature | |
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| The necessity of a creative intelligence | |
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| Hume's argument from design: The argument from experience | |
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| The problem of evil and inference to the best explanation | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Philosophy | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Traditional thought | |
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| Arguing with the Azande | |
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| The significance of literacy | |
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| Cognitive relativism | |
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| The argument against strong relativism | |
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| The argument for weak relativism | |
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| Philosophy and religion | |
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| Philosophy and science | |
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| An example: Free will and determinism | |
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| Compatibilism and moral responsibility | |
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| The special character of philosophy | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Notes | |
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| Index | |