Microeconomics Theory and Applications with Calculus

Name: Microeconomics Theory and Applications with Calculus
Price: 5.7 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780138008475

ISBN-10: 0138008477

ISBN-13: 9780138008475

Edition: 2nd 2011

Authors: Jeffrey M. Perloff

List price: $152.99

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Description:

For all intermediate Microeconomics courses at the undergraduate or graduate level. Understand the practical, problem-solving aspects of microeconomic theory. Microeconomics: Theory and Applications with Calculususes calculus, algebra, and graphs to present microeconomic theory using actual examples, and then encourages students to apply the theory to analyze real-world problems. The second edition has been substantially updated and revised, and is now offered withMyEconLab#x13;the online tutorial and assessment solution that personalizes both the teaching and learning experience.

Book details

List price: $152.99
Edition: 2nd
Copyright year: 2011
Publisher: Pearson Education, Limited
Publication date: 7/6/2010
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 800
Size: 8.00" wide x 10.50" long x 1.25" tall
Weight: 3.388
Language: English

Jeffrey M. Perloff is professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, a former member of the National Bureau of Economic Research Board of Directors, and coauthor of Modern Industrial Organization.




Introduction



Supply and Demand



A Consumerï¿½s Constrained Choice



Demand



Consumer Welfare and Policy Analysis



Firms and Production



Costs



Competitive Firms and Markets



Properties and Applications of the Competitive Model



General Equilibrium and Economic Welfare



Monopoly



Pricing and Advertising



Game Theory



Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition



Factor Markets



Uncertainty



Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods



Asymmetric Information



Contracts and Moral Hazards