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| Preface | |
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| Findings | |
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| Issues for the Future | |
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| The New Battlefield Balance | |
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| Mix of Forces | |
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| Communications That Work | |
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| Tactical Missile Defenses | |
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| Makeup of the Post-Cold War Navy | |
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| Operation Desert Storm Examined: Conduct of the War in Southwest Asia | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Historical legacy | |
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| Prelude to War: No Rotation Policy Limits Choices | |
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| Air Power: The Most Significant Factor in Winning War | |
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| Air Power as an Instrument of War | |
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| The Air Tasking Order | |
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| Tank Plinking and Other Operation Desert Storm Innovations | |
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| Interservice Fights Avoided | |
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| Ground Campaign Ultimately Forced Iraqi Military Out of Kuwait | |
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| Deception Works | |
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| Plans to Fight in Europe Created Problems in Southwest Asia | |
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| Using Ground Contingency Units | |
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| What the War Reveals About Our Military | |
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| High Tech Works | |
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| Benefits of High Tech in the Air Campaign | |
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| Benefits of High Tech on the Ground | |
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| U.S. Troops Most Qualified Ever | |
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| Communications Hampered by Old, Incompatible Equipment | |
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| Tactical Missile Defenses Succeed Politically, Raise Technical Questions | |
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| Minehunting on Land and at Sea | |
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| Counting the Iraqi Army | |
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| Table I: Accounting for the Iraqi Army | |
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| The New Battlefield Balance | |
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| New Thinking About Tooth to Tail | |
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| Table II: Accounting for the Iraqi Troops: A Rough Estimate of Enemy Strength | |
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| Complexity of Warfare Requires Sophisticated Support | |
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| Striving for a Balanced Military | |
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| Balance in the Force Structure | |
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| Balance Within Weapon Systems | |
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| Goldwater-Nichols Played a Crucial Role | |
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| Goldwater-Nichols Fosters Jointness | |
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| Unity of Command Was Key | |
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| Jointness Problems Still Remain | |
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| Providing the Forces: U.S. Personnel in the Persian Gulf Crisis | |
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| The All Volunteer Force (AVF) | |
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| Background | |
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| How Would the AVF Fight? | |
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| But Is It Fair? | |
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| Women in the Services | |
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| The Guard and Reserve | |
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| Background | |
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| Planing for World War III | |
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| Mobilization - In Pieces by Improvisation | |
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| The Shift to a Offensive Option | |
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| Army | |
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| The Mobilization | |
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| Evolution of the Call-Up | |
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| Making Units Ready and Measuring Them | |
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| What Happened? | |
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| Large Combat Units - A Special Case | |
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| Overall Impact of Army Guard and Reserve | |
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| Marine Corps | |
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| The Mobilization | |
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| How the Marine Mobilization Evolved | |
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| Caught In Midst of Revitalization | |
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| Making Units Ready for Deployment | |
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| In-Theater Training | |
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| Into Combat as Smaller Units | |
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| Combat Support and Service Support: A Special Case | |
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| Overall Impact of Marine Reserve | |
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| Air Force | |
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| The Mobilization | |
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| Tailored to Meet Requirements | |
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| Reserve After Active | |
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| Overall Impact of Air Force Guard and Reserve | |
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| Navy | |
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| The Mobilization | |
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| Tailored to Meet Needs | |
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| Overall Impact of Navy Reserve | |
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| Naval Quarantine in the Persian Gulf Crisis | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Naval Quarantine | |
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| Typical Interdiction Operations | |
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| Importance of Training | |
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| Command and Control of MIF Operations | |
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| MIF Stopped Flow of Prohibited Items | |
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| MIF Effect on Iraqi Warfighting Uncertain | |
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| Planning for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm | |
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| Introduction | |
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| CENTCOM's New Planning Focus | |
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| Planning the Air Campaign | |
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| Planned Air Campaign Had Four Phases | |
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| Planning for the Ground Offensive | |
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| Low Casualties the Highest Goal | |